University of Colorado Law School

Colorado Law Scholarly Commons
Articles

Colorado Law Faculty Scholarship

2017

The Modern Class Action Rule: Its Civil Rights Roots and
Relevance Today
Suzette M. Malveaux
University of Colorado Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.law.colorado.edu/faculty-articles
Part of the Civil Procedure Commons, Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, Constitutional Law
Commons, Legal History Commons, Legal Remedies Commons, and the Supreme Court of the United
States Commons

Citation Information
Suzette M. Malveaux, The Modern Class Action Rule: Its Civil Rights Roots and Relevance Today, 66 U.
KAN. L. REV. 325 (2017), available at https://scholar.law.colorado.edu/faculty-articles/1199.

Copyright Statement

Copyright protected. Use of materials from this collection beyond the exceptions provided for in the Fair Use and
Educational Use clauses of the U.S. Copyright Law may violate federal law. Permission to publish or reproduce is
required.
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Colorado Law Faculty Scholarship at Colorado Law
Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Articles by an authorized administrator of Colorado Law
Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact lauren.seney@colorado.edu.

The Modern Class Action Rule: Its Civil Rights
Roots and Relevance Today
Suzette M. Malveaux*
I.

INTRODUCTION

It is a golden anniversary. The modern class action rule1 recently
turned fifty years old. However, the occasion is marred by troubled times.
Hate crimes, violence and discrimination on the basis of race, religion,
gender, immigration status, sexual orientation and more are on the rise.2
Prejudice that lay dormant has recently erupted, unleashing unbridled
resentment, fury and even hatred.3 This spike has been particularly acute
* Professor of Law, Columbus School of Law, The Catholic University of America. Thank you to
the Kansas Law Review for inviting me to present at its 2016 “50th Anniversary Perspectives on the
Modern Class Action” Symposium and to publish with its journal. I appreciated the synergy of our
panel so much that I brought us back together at the 2017 Southeastern Association of Law Schools
(SEALS) Conference, which furthered my thinking on this topic. I also want to thank the faculty at
the University of Iowa College of Law and the University of Denver Sturm College of Law for their
insightful critiques and questions. I owe a debt of gratitude for the feedback of my students and the
hard work of my research assistants (especially Sarah Mysiewicz for her excellent archival research).
Finally, I continue to be grateful for and inspired by my parents whose tenacity, spirit and love guide
me in my journey.
1. Throughout this article, the modern class action rule refers to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, amended in 1966. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.
2. African-Americans, women, LGBT persons, immigrants and Muslims are being targeted in
record numbers. The latest FBI annual report—admittedly a conservative estimate because of
underreporting—reveals a six percent increase in bias-motivated criminal and related offenses. See
Latest Hate Crime Statistics Released; Annual Report Sheds Light on Serious Issue, FBI: UCR (Nov.
14, 2016), https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2015-hate-crime-statistics-released (“This year’s report,
which contains data from 14,997 law enforcement agencies, reveals 5,850 criminal incidents and 6,885
related offenses that were motivated by bias against race, ethnicity, ancestry, religion, sexual
orientation, disability, gender, and gender identity.”); see also Ryan Gabrielson, Ryann Grochowski
Jones & Eric Sagara, Deadly Force, in Black and White, PROPUBLICA (Oct. 10, 2014, 11:07 AM),
https://www.propublica.org/article/deadly-force-in-black-and-white (citing FBI reports of 1,217
deadly police shootings from 2010 to 2012 that shows “young black men are 21 times as likely as their
white peers to be killed by police”); Omar Villafranca, Muslims in U.S. Report Spike in
Discrimination, Threats, CBS NEWS (Dec. 7, 2015, 7:35 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/
news/muslims-in-u-s-report-spike-in-discrimination-threats/ (reporting accounts of discrimination
against Muslims in America).
3. Some project that this trend will continue. See, e.g., CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF HATE &
EXTREMISM, CAL. STATE UNIV., SAN BERNARDINO, FINAL U.S. STATUS REPORT HATE CRIME
ANALYSIS & FORECAST FOR 2016/2017 1–3 (2017), https://csbs.csusb.edu/sites/csusb_csbs/files
/Final%20Hate%20Crime%2017%20Status%20Report%20pdf.pdf (forecasting an increase in hate
crimes for the five largest American cities in 2017).
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following the presidential election of Donald Trump.4
Official
government policies and rhetoric have also taken a punitive turn.5 In
response, activism for racial justice, gender equality and civil and human
rights has exploded, as exemplified by the Black Lives Matter movement,6
the National Women’s March7 and the Dreamers initiative,8 among
4. See Hate Groups Increase for Second Consecutive Year as Trump Electrifies Radical Right,
S. POVERTY LAW CTR. (Feb. 15, 2017), https://www.splcenter.org/news/2017/02/15/hate-groupsincrease-second-consecutive-year-trump-electrifies-radical-right (finding “[t]he most dramatic
growth was the near-tripling of anti-Muslim hate groups” and “the number of hate groups operating
in 2016 rose to 917—up from 892 in 2015. The number is 101 shy of the all-time record set in 2011,
but high by historic standards.”); see, e.g., Over 200 Incidents of Hateful Harassment and Intimidation
Since Election Day, S. POVERTY LAW CTR. HATEWATCH (Nov. 11, 2016), https://www.splcenter.org/
hatewatch/2016/11/11/over-200-incidents-hateful-harassment-and-intimidation-election-day
(reporting nation-wide intimidation and harassment against Blacks, women, LGBT, immigrants and
Muslims, and noting that “[o]ften times, . . . many incidents, though not all, involved direct references
to the Trump campaign”); Violence Against the Transgender Community in 2017, HUM. RTS.
CAMPAIGN, http://www.hrc.org/resources/violence-against-the-transgender-community-in-2017 (“In
2016, advocates tracked at least 23 deaths of transgender people in the United States due to fatal
violence, the most ever recorded.”); Sangay K. Mishra, An Indian Immigrant is Murdered in Kansas.
It’s Part of a Spike in Hate Crimes Against South Asians, WASH. POST (March 7, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/03/07/the-kansas-murder-of-anindian-immigrant-is-part-of-a-spike-in-hate-crimes-against-south-asians/?utm_term=.699d6b03953f
(documenting a 34 percent increase in “hate violence and xenophobic political rhetoric targeting South
Asian, Muslim, Sikh, Hindu, Middle Eastern and Arab communities in the year leading up to the 2016
elections”); Press Release, Human Rights Campaign, Groundbreaking Survey of 50,000+ Young
People Reveals Troubling Post-Election Spike in Bullying (Jan. 18, 2017),
http://www.hrc.org/press/groundbreaking-survey-of-50000-young-people-reveals-troubling-postelection (“Seventy percent of respondents reported witnessing bullying, hate messages or harassment
during or since the 2016 election. Of those, [seventy-nine] percent said such behaviors have been
occurring more frequently since the onset of the presidential campaign.”).
5. See Juliet Eilperin, Emma Brown, & Darryl Fears, Trump Administration Plans to Minimize
Civil Rights Efforts in Agencies, WASH. POST (May 29, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
politics/trump-administration-plans-to-minimize-civil-rights-efforts-in-agencies/2017/05/29/
922fc1b2-39a7-11e7-a058-ddbb23c75d82_story.html?utm_term=.2cbc8e1c9d97; Dona Owens, 100
Days of Civil Rights in the Trump Administration, NBC NEWS (Apr. 29, 2017 9:17 AM),
https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/president-trumps-first-100-days/100-days-civil-rights-trumpadministration-n752536; Graham Vyse, Donald Trump’s War on Civil Rights Is Intensifying, NEW
REPUBLIC (May 20, 2017), https://newrepublic.com/minutes/142951/donald-trumps-war-civil-rightsintensifying.
6. See About the Black Lives Matter Network, BLACK LIVES MATTER,
https://blacklivesmatter.com/about/ (last visited Dec. 11, 2017); see also Elizabeth Day,
#BlackLivesMatter: The Birth of a New Civil Rights Movement, GUARDIAN (July 19, 2015),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jul/19/blacklivesmatter-birth-civil-rights-movement
(“Black America is in a state of protest. The 21st-century civil rights movement, exemplified by the
action taken by Garza and those like her, is democratic in its aims and agile in its responses. It is fueled
by grief and fury, by righteous rage against injustice and institutionalized racism and by frustration at
the endemic brutality of the state against those it deems unworthy.”).
7. See WOMEN’S MARCH ON WASHINGTON, https://www.womensmarch.com (last visited Dec.
11, 2017); Emily Barasch, A Brief History of the Women’s March on Washington, COVETEUR (Feb.
24, 2017), http://coveteur.com/2017/01/18/brief-history-womens-march-washington/.
8. The Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), initiated by the Obama
Administration, provided temporary protection from deportation and other opportunities to
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others.9
There is a peculiar irony in the fact that this modern federal class
action rule10 marks its golden anniversary within a similarly tumultuous
environment as its birth.11 The rule itself is rooted in the turbulent history
of the civil rights movement of the 1960s and was designed to enhance
civil rights enforcement.12
In response to fierce resistance to
desegregation following the iconic 1954 Brown v. Board of Education
decision, the rule drafters amended Rule 23 in 1966 to enable structural
reform and broad remedial relief.13 Since then, this aggregation device has
played a seminal role in the private enforcement of statutory and
Constitutional civil rights.

undocumented immigrants who came to the United States as children (i.e., “Dreamers”). President
Trump’s recent decision to end the program has result in protests nationwide. Noah Lanard,
Nationwide Protests Hit the Streets After Trump Decision to End Dreamer Protections, MOTHER
JONES (Sept. 5, 2017), http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2017/09/nationwide-protests-hit-thestreets-after-trump-decision-to-end-dreamer-protections/.
9. See John Bacon & Alan Gomez, Protests Against Trump’s Immigration Plan Rolling in
More than 30 Cities, USA TODAY (Jan. 29, 2017, 7:52 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/
story/news/nation/2017/01/29/homeland-security-judges-stay-has-little-impact-travel-ban/97211720;
Amber Jamieson, After the Women’s March: Six Mass US Demonstrations to Join this Spring, THE
GUARDIAN (Feb. 5, 2017, 10:33 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/feb/05/womensmarch-mass-protests-scientists-immigrants-climate-change.
10. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2). This paper focuses on this specific provision of the 1966 modern
class action rule.
11. The civil rights movement of the 1960s involved massive non-violent protests and efforts to
integrate schools, lunch counters, transportation and public accommodations, to acquire voting rights,
and to economically empower communities. Freedom riders, activists, and organizers faced church
bombings, mob violence, and terrorism by the KKK and others. For a history of the civil rights
movement, see generally Eyes on the Prize: Awakenings (1954–1956) (PBS Television broadcast
January 21, 1987); Eyes on the Prize: Fighting Back (1957–1962) (PBS Television broadcast January
28, 1987); HENRY HAMPTON & STEVE FAYER, VOICES OF FREEDOM: AN ORAL HISTORY OF THE CIVIL
RIGHTS MOVEMENT FROM THE 1950S THROUGH THE 1980S (1991) (companion book to Eyes on the
Prize).
12. See infra Part IB. See also Arthur R. Miller, Simplified Pleading, Meaningful Days in Court,
and Trials on the Merits: Reflections on the Deformation of Federal Procedure, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV.
286, 315 (2013) (Rule 23’s 1966 revision meant to “provide a useful procedural vehicle, particularly
for civil rights”); Arthur R. Miller, Some Very Personal Reflections on the Rules, Rulemaking, and
Reporters, 46 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 651, 652–53 (2013); see also generally Robert G. Bone, Walking
the Class Action Maze: Toward a More Functional Rule 23, 46 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 1097, 1102–
06 (2013) (describing the history of the 1966 amendments to Rule 23).
13. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); David Marcus, Flawed but Noble:
Desegregation Litigation and Its Implications for the Modern Class Action, 63 FLA. L. REV. 657, 695–
700 (2011) [hereinafter Marcus, Flawed but Noble]; see also RISA L. GOLUBOFF, THE LOST PROMISE
OF CIVIL RIGHTS, in CIVIL RIGHTS STORIES 25, 25–26 (2008) (“[Brown] radicalized southern whites
to resist (sometimes violently) the changes the Supreme Court’s decision set in motion.”); id. at 31
(describing “white opposition to such desegregation [as] passionate and unyielding”); id. at 26–27
(describing how civil rights lawyers challenged 75 year old “racial and economic caste system” and
how “violence and legal chicanery” in the south “made it possible to inscribe Jim Crow into legal and
political structures for generations”).
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The rule’s rich history makes clear that the drafters infused this
procedural mechanism with the capacity of being used to challenge racial
inequality and subordination.14 A half-century since its inception, Rule
23(b)(2) remains unchanged. And, like at the modern rule’s birth,
America’s civil rights climate is in turmoil. The unmasked vitriol and
prejudice against religious, ethnic and racial minorities, among others, and
the rebirth of activism to counteract this trend harkens back to the nadir of
the modern class action rule.15 The time is ripe, therefore, to determine
whether this critical aggregation device is functioning as intended.
This article proceeds as follows. Part I describes the historical
background of the modern class action rule in relation to civil rights. More
specifically, this Part reveals how the drafters deliberately crafted the rule
to address desegregation obstructionism. Part II analyzes Supreme Court
jurisprudence interpreting Rule 23(b)(2) over the course of the last fifty
years, identifying three primary periods in which the pendulum has swung:
from a heyday of liberal class certification for broad injunctive relief for
newly created rights; to a heightened critique and retraction of class
certification; to a complex gauntlet of contemporary barriers involving
evidentiary hurdles, contractual restrictions and access limitations. Part
III critiques modern class action jurisprudence and concludes that it fails
to sufficiently fulfill the drafters’ intent of creating an efficient and just
procedural mechanism for pursuing systemic racial equality. The Article
recommends a contemporary judicial interpretation more anchored to the
bone, rooted in Rule 23(b)(2)’s strong civil rights mission.
II. THE MODERN CLASS ACTION RULE’S HISTORICAL GROUNDING IN
CIVIL RIGHTS
A. The Pre-Cursor to the Modern Class Action Rule—An Equitable
Tool for Civil Rights Enforcement
The American class action rule was born in 1938 with the goal of
promoting equity and access.16 Indeed, from 1938 to 1966, the rule
14. See infra Part II. Unsurprisingly, the drafters primary target at the time was segregation,
whose pernicious existence long post-dated Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
15. See John Wagner & Scott Clement, ‘It’s Just Messed Up’: Most Think Political Divisions
as Bad as Vietnam Era, New Poll Shows, WASH. POST (Oct. 28, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2017/national/democracy-poll/?tid=a_inl&utm_term=.f8
6cfde801fa (“Seven in 10 Americans say the nation’s political divisions are at least as big as during
the Vietnam War”).
16. 7A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1752, at 18 (3d
ed. 2005).
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provided, inter alia, a mechanism for those fighting racial oppression to
act collectively. Following the 1954 seminal Brown v. Board of Education
decision—holding segregated public schools unconstitutional—the
aggregation rule was tapped for stemming systemic discrimination and
segregation in various areas including employment, education, public
accommodations and housing.17
The aggregation rule, however, required litigants to shoehorn their
case into one of three jural relations: “true,” “hybrid” or “spurious.” In a
nutshell: “true” classes involved joint or common rights; “hybrid” classes
involved several rights concerning a claim over a specific property; and
“spurious” classes involved several rights, with only a common question
and common relief justifying aggregation.18 Numerosity19 and adequacy
of representation20—principles required from the rule’s inception21—were
often satisfied for “race relations” civil rights cases from the late 1930s to
1960s.22 Within this three-tiered structure, civil rights cases were housed
in the “true” and “spurious” classes. For example, union members could
challenge racial discrimination in a collective bargaining agreement as a
“true” class because of their joint or common rights.23 By contrast,
individual litigants challenging segregated facilities as unconstitutional
often constituted a “spurious” class because of their “several” rights.24
Prior to 1966, most civil rights cases were technically classified as
“spurious.”25 Although class members sought “common relief,” and
shared a “common question of law or fact,” each class member was the
sole owner of his or her rights.26 Thus, in spurious suits, res judicata was
17. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); 7A WRIGHT, supra note 16, § 1752, at 22–25
& nn.31–34 (listing cases).
18. 7A WRIGHT, supra note 16, § 1752 at 18, 21, 28–31. These three classifications were set
forth in then-Rule 23(a). “True” class actions also included a “secondary” right: i.e. “secondary in the
sense that the owner of a primary right refuses to enforce that right and a member of the class thereby
becomes entitled to enforce it.” Id. § 1752, at 21–22.
19. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(1) (current) (“the class is so numerous that joinder of all members
is impracticable”).
20. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4) (current) (“the representative parties will fairly and adequately
protect the interests of the class”).
21. 7A WRIGHT, supra note 16, § 1752, at 20.
22. See John P. Frank, Response to 1996 Circulation of Proposed Rule 23 on Class Actions, in
2 WORKING PAPERS OF THE ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL RULES ON PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO
CIVIL RULE 23 260, 266 (Rules Committee Support Office, 1997), http://www.uscourts.gov/
sites/default/files/workingpapers-vol2.pdf.
23. 7A WRIGHT, supra note 16, § 1752, at 22–23 & n.23 (citing cases).
24. Id. § 1752, at 21–25 (noting connection between Rule 23(b)(2) class actions and the prior
“spurious” actions, “particularly those involving civil rights” and citing cases).
25. Frank, supra note 22, at 672.
26. These were requirements of spurious classes. 7A WRIGHT, supra note 16, § 1752, at 30–
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available only for the named plaintiffs and class members who
intervened.27 The nature of the rights pursued meant that such cases could
be denied certification altogether or limited to only the parties involved.28
Many, perhaps most, judges certified desegregation cases regardless
of the several rights at issue.29 While recognizing that individuals had their
constitutional rights violated and were entitled to pursue their individual
claims, many judges recognized race discrimination as inherently grouporiented and thus suited for class treatment.30 Moreover, many judges who
certified civil rights cases as “spurious” classes did not worry about the
limited res judicata implication of the label, concluding that injunctive
relief curtailing racially discriminatory policies and laws would eventually
apply more broadly even to non-parties.31
However, this approach was hardly uniform. The rule’s malleability
gave judges who opposed integration a sword with which to castrate
Brown. Judges could, and did, as easily refuse to certify a class of AfricanAmericans challenging the constitutionality of segregation policies, on the
grounds that such rights belonged to the individual.32 For those cases that
were certified as “spurious” class actions, many judges applied
desegregation orders only to the plaintiffs and against the particular
defendant institutions before them.33 This conception of the spurious
class’s utility led some commentators to conclude: “If this is really all the
‘spurious’ class suit did, then there was very little justification for its
existence.”34
31. They justified this type of class action because of the efficiency they offered. 7A WRIGHT, supra
note 16, § 1752, at 30.
27. Frank, supra note 22, at 673.
28. See David Marcus, The History of the Modern Class Action, Part I: Sturm Und Drang,
1953–1980, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 587, 601 (2013) [hereinafter Marcus, History of the Modern Class
Action]; 7A WRIGHT, supra note 16, § 1752, at 30–31.
29. Indeed, Committee Member Benjamin Kaplan noted “the very desegregation suits that are
now [in 1963] being conducted are theoretically spurious class actions, but there isn’t a judge in the
world that’s treating them that way, nor should they be treated that way.” Transcript of Sessions on
Class Actions—EE, Civil Rules Meeting Oct. 31–Nov. 2, 1963, in RECORDS OF THE U.S. JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE: COMMITTEES ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURES, 1935–1988 [hereinafter
RECORDS OF THE U.S. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE], microformed on CIS No. CI-7104, 24, 41 (Cong. Info.
Serv.); see also 7AA WRIGHT, supra note 16, § 1776, at 81–83 (“Prior to the 1966 amendment of Rule
23 most federal courts recognized that class actions were an appropriate means to vindicate an alleged
denial of civil rights. Thus, although there was no specific provision in original Rule 23 comparable
to present subdivision (b)(2), class actions were maintained challenging discrimination in
employment, education, the use of public facilities, and housing.”).
30. 7A WRIGHT, supra note 16, § 1752, at 26.
31. Id. at 28.
32. Id. at 23–26.
33. See id. at 31.
34. See id. at 31–32 (summarizing Second Circuit Judge Charles E. Clark’s perception of the
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Thus, in revamping the class action rule in 1966, the drafters
eliminated the “true,” “hybrid” and “spurious” classifications, which
conditioned the scope of the judgment’s preclusive effect on the nature of
rights pursued.35 These classifications proved unworkable, with many
judges finding them confusing, applying them inconsistently or
concluding that they were ultimately immaterial.36 The drafters moved
away from jural relations, and crafted three different types of class actions
unrelated to the former.37 The modern class action rule, revised in 1966,
sets forth the three classes:
(b) Types of Class Actions. A class action may be maintained if Rule
23(a) is satisfied and if:
(1) prosecuting separate actions by or against individual class
members would create a risk of:
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to
individual class members that would establish incompatible
standards of conduct for the party opposing the class; or
(B) adjudications with respect to individual class members that,
as a practical matter, would be dispositive of the interests of the
other members not parties to the individual adjudications or
would substantially impair or impede their ability to protect
their interests;
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on
grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive
relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting
the class as a whole; or
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to class
members predominate over any questions affecting only individual
members, and that a class action is superior to other available
methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy. . . .38

To accomplish their goal of designing an aggregation rule that would
empower those fighting for racial equality, the rule makers specifically

spurious class action as an invitation to others to join the litigation and warning to the judge to be
mindful of the relief ordered because of its potential precedential effect on non-parties).
35. Id. at 21.
36. Id. at 21–26.
37. See id. at 21 (noting a “rough correspondence” but concluding that “the old categories do
not and were not intended to coincide with the new”).
38. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b).
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drafted Rule 23(b)(2),39 permitting a class action to be maintained when a
defendant has acted on grounds generally applicable to a group, justifying
group-wide injunctive or declaratory relief.40 The Committee noted
“[i]llustrative are various actions in the civil-rights field where a party is
charged with discriminating unlawfully against a class, usually one whose
members are incapable of specific enumeration.”41 Although Rule
23(b)(2) is not limited to civil rights cases, its driving force and evolution
stem from a commitment to systemic desegregation and racial equality.42
The (b)(2) designation eliminated a distinction some courts would
make to justify prohibiting class treatment for civil rights cases.43 For
example, in the Fifth Circuit, one judge granted class certification in a case
where a registrar outright refused to deal with any African-Americans who
wanted to register to vote.44 Another judge in the Fifth Circuit, however,
denied class certification in a case where a registrar individually struck
African-American voters from the rolls because of their race.45 Because
the former challenged a policy discriminatory against a group on its face
and the latter challenged the discriminatory application of a neutral policy
to various individuals, different class treatment was justified.46 Rule
23(b)(2) makes this distinction irrelevant.
The (b)(2) provision provides court access to litigants who could not
effectively seek injunctive relief on their own.47 As a tool of equity, the
class action device cleared a way for individuals to wield more power to
39. 7AA WRIGHT, supra note 16, § 1776, at 83 (“[S]ubdivision (b)(2) was added to Rule 23 in
1966 in part to make it clear that civil-rights suits for injunctive or declaratory relief can be brought
as class actions.”); Jack Greenberg, Civil Rights Class Actions: Procedural Means of Obtaining
Substance, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 575, 577 (1997) (“The partnership between class actions and civil rights
has grown to such an extent that the Advisory Committee revising Rule 23 noted that, ‘subdivision
(b)(2) has cemented the role of class actions in enforcing a wide array of civil rights claims.’”);
Benjamin Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure (I), 81 HARV. L. REV. 356, 389 (1967) (explaining that the “new subdivision (b)(2)
[was built] on experience mainly, but not exclusively, in the civil rights field”).
40. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2).
41. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2) advisory committee’s notes to 1966 amendment (emphasis added).
42. See Marcus, Flawed but Noble, supra note 13, at 703–04; see Frank, supra note 22, at 267
(“Put at its simplest, what new Rule 23[(b)(2)] did . . . [was] make sure that suits against segregation,
as well as other civil rights cases, would be within the class action rule and would be binding as to all
members of the class liberally conceived . . . .”)
43. 7A WRIGHT, supra note 16, § 1752, at 26–28 & nn.37–40.
44. Sharp v. Lucky, 252 F.2d 910, 913 (5th Cir. 1958).
45. Reddix v. Lucky, 252 F.2d 930, 938 (5th Cir. 1958).
46. See 7A WRIGHT, supra note 16, § 1752, at 26–28 (recognizing the distinction). But see
Note, Proposed Rule 23: Class Actions Reclassified, 51 VA. L. REV. 629, 647 n.57 (1965) (doubting
the distinction).
47. See Max Helveston, Promoting Justice Through Public Interest Advocacy in Class Actions,
60 BUFF. L. REV. 749, 764 (2012).
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curb systemic misconduct through litigation.48
B. Aggregation as a Force for Addressing Civil Rights Opposition
The history of the modern class action rule, enacted in 1966, was
intimately interwoven with that of the broader civil rights struggle of the
time.49 As one of the drafters and Advisory Committee Members, John P.
Frank, revealed:
If there was [a] single, undoubted goal of the [Advisory] [C]ommittee,
the energizing force which motivated the whole rule, it was the firm
determination to create a class action system which could deal with civil
rights and, explicitly, segregation. The one part of the rule which was
never doubted was (b)(2) and without its high utility, in the spirit of the
50
times, we might well have had no rule at all.

The drafters of the modern class action rule worked before a backdrop
of intransigence and fierce resistance to desegregation efforts, especially
in the south. Following Brown’s holding that the “separate but equal”
doctrine in public schools was unconstitutional, southern backlash was
severe.51 Thus, when amending Rule 23 in 1966, the drafters were
informed by and motivated to overcome obstructionist procedural barriers
erected by legislative and judicial forces.52
State legislatures deliberately erected barriers, such as state pupil
assignment laws to preserve segregated schools.53 In an effort to keep
48. Id. (noting that drafters of (b)(2) were unsurprisingly “motivated by equitable concerns”);
id. at 764–65 (“The expansion of class action access to . . . litigants [challenging systemic civil rights
violations and discrimination] constituted an attempt to make our procedural system more equitable
by creating a means for individuals to bring injunction-based reform litigation.”).
49. Marcus, Flawed but Noble, supra note 13, at 678–79.
50. See Frank, supra note 22, at 266.
51. Marcus, Flawed but Noble, supra note 13, at 692.
52. Justice Department Assistant Attorney General and 1963 Advisory Committee Member
Louis Oberdorfer conceded the unpopularity of civil rights and labor cases at the time. In revising the
class action rule, the drafters proposed Rule 23(a), which stated that “[o]ne or more members of a class
may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if [numerosity, commonality,
typicality and adequacy were met].” Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to Rules of Civil
Procedure for the United States District Courts (Mar. 15, 1963), in RECORDS OF THE U.S. JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE, supra note 29, microformed on CIS No. CI-8004, 2, 3 (Cong. Info. Serv.) (emphasis
added). Oberdorfer questioned whether the term “only” “might be overemphasized by courts to bar
class actions in unpopular civil rights, labor, or other similar fields.” Letter from Assistant Attorney
General Louis Oberdorfer to Benjamin Kaplan (Feb. 12, 1963), in RECORDS OF THE U.S. JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE, supra note 29, microformed on CIS No. CI-7001, 2, 3 (Cong. Info. Serv.).
53. Marcus, Flawed but Noble, supra note 13, at 684. As Columbia Professor of Law and former
NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Lawyer Jack Greenberg recalls:
[M]ost southern states passed laws, known as pupil placement laws, which prescribed
procedures for application and transfer by individual black children to white schools.

334

KANSAS LAW REVIEW

Vol. 66

schools de facto segregated following Brown, local school boards would
individually assign students to schools according to race.54 Such boards
purposefully manufactured individualized issues via pupil assignment
laws, thereby making it difficult for African-American students to
collectively act through class actions.55
For example, in Potts v. Flax,56 the Fort Worth Independent School
District established a pupil assignment law post-Brown, in an attempt to
preserve a segregated public school system.57 While admitting the
existence and binding effect of Brown, the School Board nonetheless
continued to maintain a seventy-eight-year-old segregated school system
because of the Board’s unabashed support of segregation.58 AfricanAmerican students challenged the pupil assignment law as
unconstitutional and sought relief as a class action.59 The School Board
balked at the district court judge’s purported need to order the Board to
implement its law in a non-discriminatory manner, arguing that an ad hoc
approach was best.60 Based on “uncontradicted evidence,” of the Board’s
“categorical[l] reaffirm[ance of] its adherence to the formal policy of a
segregated system” the court left nothing to chance and issued an order
abolishing the pupil assignment law and requiring a concrete
desegregation plan.61
Alternatively, the School Board contended that even if the court had
the authority to issue a desegregation order as to the individual plaintiffs,
the court could not expand this to all those similarly situated.62 The Board
maintained that because admission, assignment and transfer of AfricanAmerican students had to be done on an individualized basis under the
pupil assignment law, a class action challenging the law was improper.63
Thus, the Board appealed the district court’s certification of a class of
African-American children challenging the School District’s pupil
assignment scheme as racially discriminatory. The Fifth Circuit affirmed
Although these transparently were stratagems for maintaining segregation, and although
efforts to transfer routinely were frustrated, the courts, including the Supreme Court, for
many years upheld the laws.
Greenberg, supra note 39, at 580.
54. Greenberg, supra note 39, at 580; Marcus, Flawed But Noble, supra note 13, at 684.
55. See Marcus, Flawed But Noble, supra note 13, at 684–85.
56. Potts v. Flax, 313 F.2d 284 (5th Cir. 1963).
57. Id. at 286–87.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 286.
60. Id. at 287.
61. Id. at 287–88.
62. Id. at 288.
63. Id.
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class certification, concluding, inter alia:
The issue of law—may the School Board constitutionally assign Negro
children to schools solely by reason of race?—was common to every
Negro child in the Fort Worth District. . . . [Moreover,] there was not the
slightest suggestion either on the trial (or since) that within the large mass
there was any substantial conflict either in interest or in the legal
64
positions to be advanced.

The Fifth Circuit rejected the Board’s attempt to cast the case in terms
of individual rights and remedies, and instead recognized the group-wide
harm and appropriate group-wide relief:65
[P]erhaps most important, the relief to the class . . . was a good deal more
than something merely appropriate. There is at least considerable doubt
that relief confined to individual specified Negro children either could
be granted or, if granted, could be so limited in its operative effect. By
the very nature of the controversy, the attack is on the unconstitutional
practice of racial discrimination. Once that is found to exist, the Court
66
must order that it be discontinued.

To order something shy of this would be akin to court’s outright
endorsement of segregation: “[T]o require a school system to admit the
specific successful plaintiff Negro child while others, having no such
protection, were required to attend schools in a racially segregated system,
would be for the court to contribute actively to the class discrimination
proscribed.”67
The Fifth Circuit goes so far to say that alternatively, even if the
district court erred in certifying the class action and issuing class-wide
relief, the error was harmless because the relief would have been

64. Id. at 289.
65. Id. at 288–89 (“Properly construed the purpose of the suit was not to achieve specific
assignment of specific children to any specific grade or school. The peculiar rights of specific
individuals were not in controversy. It was directed at the system-wide policy of racial segregation.
It sought obliteration of that policy of system-wide racial discrimination.”); see also id. at 289 n.5
(“[A] school segregation suit presents more than a claim of invidious discrimination to individuals by
reason of a universal policy of segregation. It involves a discrimination against a class as a class, and
this is assuredly appropriate for class relief.”) (emphasis added).
66. Id. at 288–90. Jack Greenberg makes a similar point, noting that the school desegregation
cases focused on specific African-American students who sought transfer to specific white schools.
The courts later recognized that Brown required more—i.e. an African-American child’s right to an
integrated public school system. This broader understanding of Brown’s mandate meant that a single
plaintiff could desegregate all of the schools in one lawsuit, regardless of its class action status. While
aggregation would be appropriate, it would effectively be “surplusage.” Greenberg, supra note 39, at
580–81.
67. Potts, 313 F.2d at 289.
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pragmatically speaking the same if limited to the named plaintiffs.
Potts illustrates not only the ways in which states attempted to obstruct
Brown’s desegregation mandate through pupil assignment laws, but also
the ways in which judges countered such obstruction. By way of class
certification, judges formally tailored the scope of relief to a relevant class
to avoid the potential unfairness that could result from excluding nonparties in desegregation orders. Where such protection could not be
perfected through the class action, it would be up to subsequent judges to
determine the preclusive effect of the desegregation order.
Such discretion meant that judges sympathetic to segregation could
easily undermine the scope and speed of compliance with Brown.68 Such
judges denied certification of classes seeking to integrate public schools
by relying on the largely theoretical possibility that class members’
interests might diverge,69 or that only individuals could assert their rights
under the Fourteenth Amendment.70
Another example of this phenomenon at the time is Brunson v. Board
of Trustees.71 Like Potts, forty-two African-American school children
challenged the Clarendon County School District for operating a racially
segregated school system post-Brown.72 Like many southern states,73
South Carolina had enacted a pupil placement statute, giving the School
Board the power to decide whether a student could transfer from his or her
assigned school to another one of the student’s choice.74
The students brought the case as a “spurious” class action on account
that each student had his or her own right.75 The district court struck the
class allegations in the complaint challenging the county’s segregated
68. See 7A WRIGHT, supra note 16, § 1752, at 23–24 (“Questions relating to the availability of
class actions in matters involving racial discrimination led to some difficulty.”).
69. Id. § 1752, at 26 n.35 (“The holdings . . . that actions to end segregation were not proper
class actions because some Negroes favored these suits while others were opposed to them clearly
were unsound.”); but see Marcus, History of the Modern Class Action, supra note 28, at 601
(explaining that some courts overlooked individual litigant preferences regarding potential
desegregation remedies, disregarding such conflicts of interest in favor of class certification).
70. Marcus, Flawed but Noble, supra note 13, at 682–83 (emphasis added); see 7A WRIGHT,
supra note 16, § 1752 at 25–26 (“there were courts that refused to permit a class action in this
context”); see e.g., Carson v. Warlick, 238 F.2d 724, 729 (4th Cir. 1956) (concluding that AfricanAmerican students desegregate schools “as individuals, not as a class or group; and it is as individuals
that their rights under the Constitution are asserted”).
71. 311 F.2d 107 (4th Cir. 1962).
72. Brunson v. Bd. of Trustees, 30 F.R.D. 369, 369–70 (E.D.S.D. 1962).
73. See, e.g., Potts v. Flax, 313 F.2d 284 (5th Cir. 1963) (applying Texas law); Carson v.
Warlick, 238 F.2d 724 (4th Cir. 1956) (applying North Carolina law); Carson v. Bd. of Educ., 227
F.2d 789 (4th Cir. 1955) (applying North Carolina law).
74. Brunson, 30 F.R.D. at 371.
75. Id. at 370.
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school system under the Fourteenth Amendment.76 In determining
whether there was a common question of law or fact that would justify
certification, the district court judge espoused a particularly narrow view
of Brown’s desegregation mandate, and a particularly expansive view of
the School Board’s considerations under its pupil assignment law.
In an opinion that did not even mention Brown’s name, the district
court judge exhorted all of the things Brown did not decide:
It has not decided that the federal courts are to take over or regulate the
public schools of the states. It has not decided that the states must mix
persons of different races in the schools or must require them to attend
schools or must deprive them of the right of choosing the schools they
77
attend.

The judge justified segregation post-Brown by outrageously
suggesting in 1962 that it was voluntary:
[I]f the schools which [the state] maintains are open to children of all
races, no violation of the Constitution is involved even though the
children of different races voluntarily attend different schools, as they
attend different churches. . . . The Fourteenth Amendment is a limitation
upon the exercise of power by the state or state agencies, not a limitation
78
upon the freedom of individuals.

The judge concluded that the law was settled and that there was no
common legal question to decide. The judge also concluded that there was
no common question of fact by adopting the School Board’s
characterization of a highly individualized pupil assignment process:
In determining the school to which a pupil is entitled to go, a School
Board must consider a great many factors unrelated to race, such as
geography, availability of bus transportation, availability of classroom
space, and scholastic attainment. . . . There is no allegation in the
complaint showing that the factual situation with reference to each of the
plaintiffs is the same. Undoubtedly the plaintiffs reside in different
places, they are of different ages, they are of different scholastic
attainment. . . . This [pupil assignment] statute provides that the case of
79
each child shall be considered individually.

The School Board’s divide-and-conquer strategy effectively masked
the common question of whether race was the determinant for pupil
76.
77.
78.
79.

Id. at 372.
Id. at 371.
Id.
Id.
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assignments. The fact that plaintiffs were not identical sufficed to make
the pupil assignment decision riddled with individual questions and the
case inappropriate for certification.80 Not only did the judge swallow the
School Board’s manufactured individualism whole, he also concluded that
the equal protection claims could only be pursued individually, thereby
foreclosing collective action.81
The Fourth Circuit reversed, concluding that the plaintiffs were
entitled to bring their case collectively. For starters, the Fourth Circuit
was not fooled into thinking that the myriad of possible individual factors
explained Clarendon County’s completely segregated public school
system:
[T]he defendants are operating a biracial school system in which all
assignments are on the basis of race. . . . The complaint does not present
those disparate factual controversies which the District Court
82
envisioned.

The Fourth Circuit concluded that threaded throughout the case was
the common question of whether the School Board involuntarily assigned
students on the basis of race, thereby making certification proper.83
Moreover, while conceding that it had held “that rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment are individual and are to be individually
asserted[,]” the Fourth Circuit observed that “comparable cases have been
almost uniformly brought as spurious class actions” and involved common
questions.84 Indeed, “[u]ntil the desegregation process is largely
accomplished, many subsequent cases may be expected to present
common questions of fact, for many individuals are likely to be affected
in substantially the same way so long as a school board continues old
discriminatory practices.”85 That constitutional claims were several was
no bar to collective action.
Upon the Fourth Circuit’s reversal and remand, the outcome was quite
different, with a different district court judge’s not only certifying the
80. Id. at 372; see also Brunson v. Bd. of Trustees, 311 F.2d 107, 108 (4th Cir. 1962) (holding
that the district court found “no common question of fact because the School Board was entitled to
consider a great many factors other than race in assigning individuals to particular schools”).
81. Brunson, 30 F.R.D. at 372 (“It is the individual who is entitled to the equal protection of the
law. . . . [H]e alone may complain that his constitutional privilege has been invaded. He has the right
to enforce this constitutional privilege or he has the right to waive it.”).
82. Brunson, 311 F.2d at 109.
83. Id. In fact, the Fifth Circuit noted that “the court’s consideration of these problems is
facilitated by the presence of multiple plaintiffs.” Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
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class, but ordering the School Board to admit and enroll African-American
students wishing to attend White schools.86 While the School District
conceded that it operated racially separate White and Black elementary
and high schools, and contended that this “system is maintained in
accordance with the wishes and desires of the great majority of parents of
both races,” and “places each child in the school to which he is best suited
for educational potential,”87 the court issued findings of fact quite to the
contrary.88 The court found that defendants continued to maintain a
“compulsory biracial school system” in which no White or AfricanAmerican child had ever been assigned to a school comprised of those of
the other race.89 The School District’s explanations for its post-Brown
segregated public school system were exposed as a sham and violation of
the Constitution:
The defendants have made no substantial effort to comply with . . . the
Brown decisions. . . . Neither have they proposed any plan to implement
these desegregation decisions, and have indicated . . . that they have no
present intentions to do so. . . . [T]his Court must conclude that the
defendants . . . are acting . . . to deprive the plaintiffs and others of their
class of their constitutional rights, under the due process and equal
protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. . . . Defendants are
operating the schools . . . in a discriminatory manner based exclusively
upon the race of the students . . . [,] precisely the practice condemned in
90
the field of public education by . . . Brown . . . .

Over the objections of the School District that segregated schools were
in the best interests of both races and in accordance with the Fourteenth
Amendment’s equal protection clause, the district court judge had to
reiterate that “Brown . . . has clearly and unmistakenly declared that in the
field of public education discrimination against an individual based upon
race is injurious to the aggrieved person and denies him certain
fundamental constitutional rights.”91 Where the School District’s pupil
assignment law operated as a burden to those pursuing their constitutional
claims,92 the court did not require them to exhaust state administrative
remedies, but rather granted them class-wide injunctive relief.93 In sum,
86. Brunson v. Bd. of Trustees, 244 F. Supp. 859, 859–60 (E.D.S.C. 1965).
87. Id. at 860.
88. Id. at 861–62.
89. Id. at 861.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 862.
92. Id. at 863.
93. Id. at 863–65. The defendants were ordered to immediately admit and enroll the nine
students whose claims had not yet become moot. Id. at 863. The court, however, gave the defendants
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the Brunson story illustrates how malleable and subject to manipulation
the class certification determination could be and was prior to the modern
class action rule.
Judges also deprived litigants of meaningful relief via class
certification denials in other ways. For example, an individual student’s
school desegregation case would be mooted by the student’s graduation
from his home school.94 Or, in the event that an individual student
prevailed in his desegregation suit, he would be deprived of broad
systemic relief that would desegregate the school for others.95
In light of such legislative and judicial tactics, the drafters sought to
create a Rule 23 provision that would address such sabotage. The
Advisory Committee moved to create an effective procedural tool that
would more easily enable and incentivize courts to issue systemic
desegregation orders post-Brown.96
Moreover, the Committee also sought to enable private citizens to
supplement federal agency efforts in bringing about systemic change. The
drafters understood the importance of private enforcement that emerged
from historic federal civil rights statutes, such as the Civil Rights Act of
1964.97 This Act effectively deputized citizens to act as private attorneysgeneral when enforcing federal statutory civil rights.98 As Advisory
Committee Member John P. Frank revealed, Rule 23’s 1966 re-write took
place “in direct parallel to the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the race
relations echo of that decade was always in the committee room.”99
more time to admit others similarly situated because of practical concerns. Id. at 863–64.
94. See Marcus, Flawed but Noble, supra note 13, at 679.
95. Maureen Carroll, Class Action Myopia, 65 DUKE L.J. 843, 859 (2016); Marcus, Flawed but
Noble, supra note 13, at 679–80, 710.
96. See Marcus, Flawed but Noble, supra note 13, at 709–10.
97. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
98. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (2012); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 415 (1975)
(recognizing “private attorney general” in Title VII case brought by private plaintiffs); Suzette
Malveaux, A Diamond in the Rough: Trans-Substantivity of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and
Its Detrimental Impact on Civil Rights, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 455, 488 n.195 (2014) [hereinafter
Malveaux, A Diamond in the Rough] (“As recognized by the Supreme Court and Congress, class
actions are part of the Title VII enforcement scheme.”); see contra Lawyers for Justice, et al, Comment
to the Civil Rules Advisory Committee: To Restore a Relationship Between Classes and Their
Actions: A Call for Meaningful Reform of Rule 23 2 (Aug. 9, 2013),
http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/fr_import/13-CV-G-suggestion.pdf (“Some practitioners
and commentators justify today’s usage of Rule 23 as comprising a ‘private attorneys general’ system
that forces compliance with legal standards that would otherwise escape punishment. But our legal
system already has public attorneys general and many other avenues for bringing about the outcomes
that are preferred by those who justify Rule 23 in that way.”).
99. Frank, supra note 22, at 266. Frank further noted the importance of the “social setting, for
this had a most direct bearing on this rule.” Id.
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Interestingly, some of the rule’s architects themselves were personally
involved in the civil rights issue of the time—desegregation.100 Reporter
Professor Benjamin Kaplan, for example, worked with the NAACP on
desegregation litigation in the 1940s.101 Associate Reporter Professor
Albert M. Sacks also advised the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational
Fund102 and marched with the Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr. at the
March on Washington in August of 1963, just two months before a key
Advisory Committee meeting was held on revisions to Rule 23.103
Committee Member Professor Charles Alan Wright worked vigorously in
Texas against segregation: fighting the state legislature’s enactment of
pupil placement laws that would thwart Brown; leading campaigns to
desegregate his church and children’s private school; and later delivering
a memorial address at the state university for the Reverend Martin Luther
King, Jr.104 Finally, Committee Member John P. Frank, Esq. advised
Thurgood Marshall of the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund
pre-Brown, and wrote an amicus brief on behalf of almost 200 law
professors in Sweatt v. Painter,105 which held segregation at the University
of Texas Law School unconstitutional.106 Primary drafters had skin in the
game.107 Not surprisingly, their commitment to civil rights was consistent
100. I am grateful to Professor David Marcus for bringing this important history to my attention
in his work. See Marcus, Flawed but Noble, supra note 13, at 702-03.
101. Marcus, Flawed but Noble, supra note 13, at 692, 702; see also Arthur R. Miller, In
Memoriam: Benjamin Kaplan, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1354, 1357 & n.8 (describing how “certain critical
elements of Federal Rule 23 on class actions were drafted” by Kaplan and that “everyone connected
with the revision of the rule saw the procedure as essential in the civil rights field”).
102. Greenberg, supra note 39, at 577 (recognizing Sacks’s role as an instructor at the NAACP
Legal Defense and Educational Fund’s training sessions over a period of years).
103. Marcus, Flawed But Noble, supra note 13, at 702–03. The Advisory Committee would meet
October 31 to November 2, 1963 to discuss amendments to Rule 23. See also Alfonso A. Narvaezs,
Albert M. Sacks, 70, Harvard Law Dean and Noted Teacher, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 23, 1991),
http://www.nytimes.com/1991/03/23/obituaries/albert-m-sacks-70-harvard-law-dean-and-notedteacher.html (noting Sack’s service on the United States Supreme Court Advisory Committee on Rules
of Civil Procedure and Massachusetts Attorney General’s advisory committee on civil rights and civil
liberties).
104. Marcus, Flawed But Noble, supra note 13, at 703.
105. 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
106. Adam Liptak, J.P. Frank, 84, a Lawyer in Landmark Cases, Dies, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 10,
2002), http://www.nytimes.com/2002/09/10/us/j-p-frank-84-a-lawyer-in-landmark-cases-dies.html.
107. Other Advisory Committee members were leaders in the desegregation efforts of the time.
For example, William T. Coleman, Jr. was a pioneer in the civil rights area. Matt Schudel, William T.
Coleman Jr., Barrier-Breaking Civil Rights Lawyer, Cabinet Officer, Dies at 96, WASH. POST (Mar.
31, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/william-t-coleman-jr-transportation-secretaryand-civil-rights-lawyer-dies-at-96/2017/03/31/94c21ce6-1624-11e7-833c-503e1f6394c9_
story.html?utm_term=.6ebeaa1bd82c; see also Abraham L. Freedman Papers: Collection Overview,
TEMPLE UNIV. LIBRARY, https://library.temple.edu/scrc/abraham-l-freedman-papers (last visited Nov.
21, 2017) (Advisory Committee Member Abraham Freedman was involved in desegregating Girard
College, representing minorities in housing discrimination cases, and combatting employment and
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with their work on the Advisory Committee.
C. The Story of How the Original Drafters Crafted the Modern Civil
Rights Class Action Rule
The drafters were unified around creating an effective procedural tool
to address significant backlash to integration. They wrestled, however,
with a variety of complex issues. The drafters debated issues of res
judicata, individual liberty and due process, and the form and scope of the
rule itself.108 The historical record reveals a serious examination of these
seminal issues.109
1. Res Judicata
First, central to aggregate litigation is the extent to which a collective
action will bind others and preclude them from bringing their own actions.
Of particular concern over the modern class action rule’s development was
the res judicata effect of a class judgment and whether it would unfairly
capture individual class members. The res judicata debate is reflected
early on in the Committee’s 1962 Deskbook.110 In this tentative proposal
to modify Rule 23, there is an explication of Hansberry v. Lee,111 and the
recognition of res judicata as a public policy choice. The 1962 Deskbook
explains: “The Hansberry case is consistent with this view that a class
action is not ousted by the mere fact that some members do not relish the
litigation. Other factors were at work in Hansberry.”112
Hansberry v. Lee is the Supreme Court decision upon which the
education anti-Semitism discrimination); Charles Joiner Obituary (1916-2017), THE ANN ARBOR
NEWS
(Mar.
16,
2017),
http://obits.mlive.com/obituaries/annarbor/obituary.aspx?pid=
184500638 (Advisory Committee Member Charles Joiner was a “Life Member of the NAACP”);
Arthur J. Freund Papers, 1884-1975, MISSOURI HISTORY MUSEUM, http://collections.mohistory.org/
resources/102992 (Advisory Committee Member Arthur J. Freund was a “prominent St. Louis
attorney and civil rights advocate”).
108. See infra notes 109–181 and accompanying text.
109. Advisory Committee member and drafter John P. Frank recognized the gravitas of the task
twenty years after the rule’s revision: “This was a committee which in every respect was prepared to
think big. Rulemaking was a high profile and significant activity. All meetings of the committee were
held in the Supreme Court building and Chief Justice Warren often dropped in for portions of the
meetings.” Frank, supra note 22, at 265.
110. The Deskbook is the “preliminary memorandum” of the Advisory Committee. 1962
Deskbook Topic EE: Tentative Proposal to Modify Provisions Governing Class Actions—Rule 23, in
RECORDS OF THE U.S. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, supra note 29, microformed on CIS No. CI-6309, 1
(Cong. Info. Serv.) [hereinafter 1962 Deskbook].
111. 311 U.S. 32 (1940).
112. 1962 Deskbook, supra note 110, at 23–25, 27.
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award-winning “A Raisin in the Sun” was inspired.113 The author of the
play, Lorraine Hansberry, was the youngest child of an African-American
family who purchased property in an all-White neighborhood in
Chicago.114 Their effort to live in the neighborhood was obstructed by
Anna M. Lee and other White neighbors, who brought an action in the
Circuit Court of Cook County, on behalf of themselves and other
landowners, to enforce a racially restrictive covenant and enjoin the
Hansberry family from moving into the neighborhood.115 The covenant,
entered into by about 500 landowners, stipulated both that “for a specified
period no part of the land should be ‘sold, leased to or permitted to be
occupied by any person of the colored race,’” and that ninety-five percent
of the landowners had to have signed the agreement for it to be valid.116
Lorraine Hansberry’s father, Carl Augustus Hansberry, had purchased
land from an owner who had signed the agreement, leading White
plaintiffs to bring a class action alleging breach of the covenant and
seeking an injunction.117 However, the Hansberry family and other
defendants contended that the agreement was invalid because it had not
been signed by the requisite ninety-five percent.118
Plaintiffs contended that the validity of the covenant had been
determined in a prior Illinois state court action, Burke v. Kleiman,119 and
therefore the issue was res judicata in this case. Defendants rebutted that
they could not be bound by the prior judgment because they were not
parties to the prior suit nor in privity with any of the parties or successors
in interest to the prior suit.120 The defendants further argued that binding
them to the prior judgment in Burke v. Kleiman would deny them due
process under the Fourteenth Amendment.121
No matter. The Circuit Court concluded that res judicata applied to
the Hansberrys, even after finding on the merits that only fifty-four percent
of the owners had signed the agreement and that the ninety-five percent
113. The play is about an African-American family who considers moving into a white
neighborhood, and won the New York Drama Critics’ Circle Award. ANNE CHENEY, LORRAINE
HANSBERRY 26 (Twayne 1984); Jay Tidmarsh, The Story of Hansberry: The Rise of the Modern Class
Action, in CIVIL PROCEDURE STORIES 217, 217 (Kevin M. Clermont, 1st ed., 2004). For a rich,
contextualized story of Hansberry v. Lee, see generally id. at 217–79.
114. Tidmarsh, supra note 113, at 217.
115. Hansberry, 311 U.S. at 32, 37–38.
116. Id. at 37–38.
117. Id. at 32, 37–38.
118. Id. at 38.
119. 277 Ill. App. 519 (1934).
120. Hansberry, 311 U.S. at 38.
121. Id.
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figure had been the result of a “false and fraudulent stipulation.”122 The
Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed, concluding that the prior Burke v.
Kleiman case was a class or representative action, and that the Hansberrys
were members of that plaintiff class seeking to enforce the covenant and
were thus bound by its decree.123 Although the stipulation about ninetyfive percent owner-support was deemed erroneous but neither fraudulent
nor collusive,124 this did not change the binding nature of the prior Burke
v. Kleiman class action judgment.125 The Hansberrys appealed this ruling
and the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine the
constitutionality of binding the Hansberrys to the prior judgment.
While giving a nod to federalism, the Supreme Court made clear its
role in protecting constitutional due process.126 Hansberry established that
although one is not bound by a judgment in a case in which he is not a
party, the significant exception to that rule is a class or representative
action.127 Where a party shares the same interests as a non-party and the
former adequately represents the latter’s interest, a judgment in a class
action comports with due process and may have res judicata effect.128
Applying this standard, the Court concluded that the Hansberrys—who
sought to discredit the racially restrictive covenant—were not members of
the plaintiff class in Burke v. Kleiman who sought to enforce the
covenant.129 This blatant conflict of interest ran counter to due process
requirements.130 Moreover, the defendants in Burke v. Kleiman had not
been designated as a class of landowners resisting the covenant’s
performance, which could have arguably bound the Hansberrys or
foreclosed their defense.131
Hansberry set a constitutional floor from which the rulemakers could
establish the res judicata effect of class action decrees. The 1962
Deskbook indicates that Hansberry was a good reminder that the
preclusive impact of class judgments was not a foregone conclusion, but a
122. Id.
123. Id. at 39.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 39–40.
126. Id. at 40.
127. Id. at 40–41.
128. Id. at 41–43.
129. Id. at 44–45 (“It is plain that in such circumstances all those alleged to be bound by the
agreement would not constitute a single class in any litigation brought to enforce it. Those who sought
to secure its benefits by enforcing it could not be said to be in the same class with or represent those
whose interest was in resisting performance . . . .”).
130. Id. at 45 (“[R]epresentatives . . . whose substantial interests are not necessarily or even
probably the same as those whom they are deemed to represent, does not afford that protection to
absent parties which due process requires.”).
131. Id. at 45–46.
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policy choice—apropos for an equitable doctrine:
While the class action should look toward a binding adjudication as the
norm, this result cannot be assured in the action itself; for the question
of binding effect can only come up for effective decision in a later action.
Moreover, the question of res judicata may be materially influenced by
what has occurred between the time of judgment and the time the
question arises for decision. For example, suppose a class action by
Negro plaintiffs asserting civil rights in one or another context. The
action may satisfy the requirements for a class action with,
presumptively, binding effect on the class. Suppose the judgment is for
the defendant. Manifestly, if the condition of law changes favorably to
the asserted civil rights, the judgment will not preclude a later action by
members of the class for the same relief earlier claimed. Speaking more
generally, res judicata is merely the expression of one public policy, and
“as the embodiment of a public policy, [it] must, at times, be weighed
against competing interests, and must, on occasion, yield to other
132
policies.”

The rulemakers clashed over whether Rule 23(b)(2) would invite res
judicata abuse and whether Hansberry was an effective prophylactic for
such abuse. For example, in a January 21, 1963 letter from Committee
Member John P. Frank to Reporter Benjamin Kaplan, Frank expressed this
concern:
Without doubting for a moment the immense utility of class actions and
the importance of making them available to their full proper limit, the
presumption I think ought to be against them particularly where they are
to be res judicata as to others because of the loss of individual liberty
involved where the individual is deprived from tending to his own
business. . . . With regard to your paragraph (c)(2) [the precursor to
(b)(2)], I am in deep trouble. These are particularly the civil rights cases.
Instinct tells me that in the civil rights field we would be better off with
stare decisis, but my good friends Charlie Wright and Skelly Wright tell
me I am wrong, and this may well be a case in which two “wrights” do
make me wrong. My theory is that such class actions could be used to
achieve res judicata results of a most destructive sort and that to permit
this particular use broadens class actions beyond their other utility.
Hansberry v. Lee gives more comfort to others than it does to me. The
language you have chosen for this paragraph seems to me to have no
limitation at all and that so long as enough people are involved, almost
any situation could give rise to a class action. . . . In short, given numbers
and a common problem, the [(b)(2) precursor] language seems to me to
133
include the universe and to exclude nothing.

1962 Deskbook, supra note 110, at 27 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
Letter from John P. Frank to Benjamin Kaplan (Jan. 21, 1963), in RECORDS OF THE U.S.
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, supra note 29, microformed on CIS No. CI-6312, 8, 9–10 (Cong. Info. Serv.)
(emphasis added).
132.
133.
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Reporter Kaplan was assuaged that Hansberry, the rule’s own
adequacy of representation requirement, and the Court’s flexible
application of the equitable doctrine provided sufficient protection from
res judicata abuse. Kaplan’s February 7, 1963 letter in response to Frank
explains:
As to the “binding” effect of an erroneous judgment in a civil-rights class
action which for one reason or another is not corrected by appeal, note
that subdivision (a) would initially call for adequate representation, and
there is the backstop of Hansberry v. Lee. Moreover, . . . the Court is not
likely to apply ordinary ideas of former adjudication if by reason of an
erroneous decision in a class action a particular school or county became
134
a legal anomoly [sic].

Committee Member Wright also concluded that not only was
Hansberry sufficient, but the concern over res judicata abuse was
overblown and unfounded in the context of desegregation jurisprudence.
In a February 16, 1963 letter from Committee Member Charles Wright to
Reporter Kaplan, the former seemed to see res judicata abuse as a red
herring that would further greenlight southern resistance to desegregation:
For myself, Hansberry seems a complete answer to such fears, but if
another answer is required, here it is. For nine years astute Southern
lawyers have sought by every means to stop or delay the desegregation
process. That the class action device is available for desegregation
cases has been amply demonstrated by a long list of cases. I have
followed this kind of litigation with much care, and have yet to see a case
in which a collusive class suit has even been attempted in the hope that
it would have destructive res judicata effect. There is only one case I
know of which is even colorably in this class, though here I think the
135
original action was a good faith action which was merely premature.

After much debate, the rulemakers crafted a modern rule that
eliminated the non-binding “spurious” class altogether, and provided
sufficient safeguards and flexibility that justified res judicata for all class
judgments. Reporter Kaplan noted this advance in the October 31st to
November 2nd, 1963 Civil Rules Committee Meeting:
134. Letter from Benjamin Kaplan to John P. Frank, (Feb. 7, 1963), in RECORDS OF THE U.S.
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, supra note 29, microformed on CIS No. CI-6312, 16, 18 (Cong. Info. Serv.);
see also Kaplan, supra note 39, at 389 n.128 (noting the potential risk of res judicata in a (b)(2) civil
rights class action where plaintiffs have lost on the merits and the law has subsequently changed, but
concluding that this risk is reduced by “precedent for limiting res judicata effects of litigation when
the legal ambience has changed”).
135. Letter from Charles Alan Wright to Benjamin Kaplan (Feb. 16, 1963), in RECORDS OF THE
U.S. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, supra note 29, microformed on CIS No. CI-7004, 3, 5 (Cong. Info. Serv.)
(emphasis added).
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[W]e go on to the very important provision in (c)(2) which says that if
an action is to be maintained as a class action of any one of the three
categories, then the judgment in the action is to extend to the class,
whether or not favorable to the class. In other words, we have eliminated
from Rule 23 the old style spurious action, where a suit normally called
a class suit isn’t really that at all. It seems to me that this is a notable
136
advance . . . .

2. Individual Autonomy and Due Process
Second, the drafters were at odds over the related issue of individual
litigant autonomy. John P. Frank, while a supporter of aggregation, felt
strongly that it was best cabined because of its fundamental challenge to
due process and individual liberty. It informed his view on res judicata,
and the scope of the rule itself.137 While his colleagues, including Reporter
Kaplan, shared this concern, they were satisfied that the rule contained
safety measures that protected this liberty interest,138 and urged Frank to
think more outside the box in amending the rule.139 At the Civil Rules
Meeting held in the fall of 1963, Frank addressed the Chair:
I am, as to most of Topic . . . [Rule 23], really extremely happy. I’m
genuinely serious, I think this is a tremendous thing . . . . The class action
is a very useful action, and at the same time it must be regarded as an
exception, because it deprives a citizen of his right to his trial and to his
day in court. So that clearly we must balance the necessity on the one
140
hand with plain individual liberty of a very basic sort on the other.

At the urging of his colleagues and with clarification made to the
notes, by January 31, 1964, “Mr. Frank [was] reluctantly willing to see the
individual’s liberty somewhat limited” at least with respect to the (b)(2)
class.141 This was not true of (b)(3). In his May 28, 1965 partial Dissent
136. Transcript of Sessions on Class Actions—EE, supra note 29, at 24. This was not only
notable, but to some commentators, it was “by far the most important contribution of amended Rule
23” as well as “perhaps its most controversial.” 1 WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN ET AL., NEWBERG ON
CLASS ACTIONS § 1:15 (5th ed. 2012).
137. See Letter from John P. Frank to Benjamin Kaplan (Mar. 22, 1963), in RECORDS OF THE
U.S. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, supra note 29, microformed on CIS No. CI-7001, 9, 9–10 (Cong. Info.
Serv.) (expressing enthusiasm about the categorical statement on the binding effect of spurious class
actions and expressing concern about the potential scope of the proposed rule).
138. Letter from Benjamin Kaplan to John P. Frank (Feb. 7, 1963), supra note 134, at 18, (“The
question of individual freedom of action has concerned us and we believe we have respected this
freedom. See . . . [describing] considerations . . . and . . . procedural safeguards . . . .”).
139. See id. at 18 (“A certain amount of cautious adventuresomeness is needed in revising the
class-action Rule . . . .”).
140. Transcript of Sessions on Class Actions–EE, supra note 29, at 30–31 (emphasis added).
141. Letter from B.K. (Benjamin Kaplan) and A.M.S. (Albert M. Sacks) (Jan. 31, 1964) in
RECORDS OF THE U.S. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, supra note 29, microformed on CIS No. CI-7003, 6,
11 (Cong. Info. Serv.).
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to the Committee’s Rule 23 recommendations, Frank opposed the (b)(3)
provision, largely because it offended individual autonomy:
I would . . . delete section (b)(3) and the related portion of section (c)(2)
[binding class members] for these reasons: . . .
To me as a matter of plain individual liberty, every American should be
able to make his own decisions about his own lawsuits, including
whether to bring them at all. Any class suit conflicts with this
principle—a person is swept up will-nilly. In some very limited
categories, this is necessary . . . . [But t]he notion that this may be a
convenient way to dispose of disputes leaves me stone-cold. It is not
difficult to think of convenient ways to do many things at the cost of
individual liberty, but convenience should never be glorified at the
expense of leaving with the individual the maximum possible right to
decide whom and when he sues.
Fundamentally, . . . the Rule 23 amendments, to the extent of my
objection, involve determining the rights of persons who are not really
effectively present to speak for themselves. Because I am against this
justitia in absentia, I have voted against . . . [some of the Rule 23]
142
proposals.

Ultimately, however, the rulemakers coalesced around permitting
aggregation for (b)(2) civil rights cases, allowing some loss of individual
autonomy where class cohesiveness was insured by opposing party’s
acting on grounds generally applicable to the class and seeking primarily
class-wide injunctive or declaratory relief.
3. Scope and Structure of the Rule
Third, the drafters clashed over the appropriate availability of
aggregation and breadth of the rule. For example, some rulemakers
expressed concern over the scope of Rule 23(b)(1)’s pre-cursor, fearing
that it would include mass accidents.143 In a January 21, 1963 letter to
Reporter Kaplan, Committee Member Frank flagged this concern early in
the revision process:
We now reach the heart of the matter, and it is here that I have my
142. Advisory Committee on Civil Rules Dissenting View of Committee Member John P. Frank
(May 28, 1965), in RECORDS OF THE U.S. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, supra note 29, microformed on CIS
No. CI-7107, 2, 2–3 (Cong. Info. Serv.) (emphasis added).
143. See Letter from Benjamin Kaplan to John P. Frank (Feb. 7, 1963), supra note 134, at 17
(“[Y]ou fear that the mass accident cases may creep in through [the Rule 23(b)(1) pre-cursor]. I, too,
am anxious to keep them out.”).
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greatest difficulty. . . . I wish we could have tighter language on the
matters covered in your paragraph (c)(1) [Rule 23(b)(1)’s pre-cursor]. . .
. But the Rule language is so broad that an immense amount more could
get under this tent. Let me illustrate. I am, I believe, unpersuadably
opposed to the use of the class action in the mass tort situation. You
144
seem, though less categorically opposed, unsympathetic to it yourself.

This concern, however, was not shared for the civil rights cases. Frank
lost consensus there. In response to Frank, in a February 7, 1963 response
letter, Reporter Kaplan discouraged such a cramped conception for civil
rights cases:
I agree with you that subdivision (c)(2) [Rule 23(b)(2)’s pre-cursor]
needs very careful attention, and we should continue to search for better
language so that unintended categories do not come in. I do not,
however, share your concern about taking in civil rights cases. On
analysis they seem to belong in the (c) category.
If a school desegregation case, for example, is maintained by an
individual on his own behalf, rather than as a class action, very likely the
relief will be confined to admission of the individual to the school and
will not encompass broad corrective measures—desegregation of the
school. This would be unfortunate. But if the relief is to encompass
broad corrective measures, then it is fitting that the action be conducted
as a class action.
I may add that if the action is not maintained as a class action, the
contempt remedy would presumably not be available to anyone but the
individual plaintiff, and others in similar position could be put to separate
145
proceedings with ensuing delay.

This desire to protect desegregation cases from legislative and judicial
backlash led to a related debate over the form of the rule itself. In
particular, the drafters differed over the propriety of creating a separate
(b)(2) provision rather than including civil rights cases under Rule
23(b)(1). Rule 23(b)(1), as amended, would allow a class action to be
maintained if:
[P]rosecuting separate actions by or against individual class members
would create a risk of:

144. See Letter from John P. Frank to Professor Benjamin Kaplan (Jan. 21, 1963), in RECORDS
OF THE U.S. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, supra note 29, microformed on CIS No. CI-6312, 8, 9–10 (Cong.
Info. Serv.).
145. See Letter from Benjamin Kaplan to John P. Frank (Feb. 7, 1963), supra note 134, at 17–18
(paragraph breaks added).
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(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual
class members that would establish incompatible standards of conduct
146
for the party opposing the class;
or
(B) adjudications with respect to individual class members that, as a
practical matter, would be dispositive of the interests of the other
members not parties to the individual adjudications or would
147
substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests[.]

Alternatively, Rule 23(b)(2) would allow a class action to be
maintained so long as “the party opposing the class has acted or refused to
act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive
relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class
as a whole[.]”148
John P. Frank argued on a number of occasions that Rule 23(b)(1)—a
mandatory, binding class action that subsumed the vast majority of “true”
class actions—offered a logical home for civil rights cases, thereby
making (b)(2) redundant.149 On March 22, 1963, he wrote his fellow
colleagues:
As I see it, [the lines in Rule 23(b)(2)] are not necessary to reach the civil
rights cases. These are covered perfectly well (to me) by subdivision (1).
. . . I can’t imagine more inconsistent results than a possible holding that
150
a school should be segregated as to one applicant and not as to another.

His colleagues were unpersuaded. Committee Member Charles Alan
Wright shared his skepticism to Reporter Benjamin Kaplan in a March 30,
1963 letter:
John Frank’s proposal to drop subdivision[] (2) . . . of Rule 23(b) is not,

146. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1)(A). The Advisory Committee Note provides the following
example: “individual litigations of the rights and duties of riparian owners . . . could create a possibility
of incompatible adjudications.” FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s notes to 1966 amendment.
147. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1)(B). The Advisory Committee Note provides the following example:
“when claims are made by numerous persons against a fund insufficient to satisfy all claims.” FED.
R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s notes to 1966 amendment.
148. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2).
149. Letter from John Frank to Benjamin Kaplan (Mar. 22, 1963), supra note 137, at 9, 11.
150. Id.; see also Memorandum from B.K. (Benjamin Kaplan) and A.M.S. (Albert M. Sacks) on
Additional Points on Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments of March 15, 1963, in RECORDS OF
THE U.S. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, supra note 29, microformed on CIS No. CI-7001 (Cong. Info. Serv.),
19, 21 (“Mr. Frank has suggested that (b)(2) may be unnecessary in the light of (b)(1)(A) and (B)(p.
EE-1)”); Completion of Work of Comm. Meeting of Oct. 31–Nov. 2, 1963, in RECORDS OF THE U.S.
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, supra note 29, microformed on CIS No. CI-7104, 4, 7–11 (Cong. Info. Serv.)
(contending that (b)(2) and (b)(3) are unnecessary and that there is nothing worth doing under these
provisions that cannot be done under (b)(1)(A) and (b)(1)(B)).
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at first blush, persuasive to me. I do not think that (b)(1) by itself would
reach the segregation cases. It would not “establish incompatible
standards of conduct for the party opposing the class” to tell a school
board that it must accept Smith in a white school but need not accept
Jones. This is exactly what the Fort Worth School Board wanted to be
told in Potts v. Flax. Nor do I see how a judgment that Smith must be
accepted would “as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of
the other members not parties to the adjudications or substantially impair
or impede their ability to protect their interests.” I would be delighted to
151
drop all of (b), but oppose dropping (b)(2).

At the October 31st to November 2nd, 1963 Civil Rules Meeting, John
P. Frank, while recognizing the importance of desegregation class actions,
reiterated his disapproval of the (b)(2) option:
I think we’ve got it in parts (b)(1)(A) and (B), that is to say if we
reviewed the great bulk of the cases—and I’m now speaking of 95% of
the cases which have been true class actions in the past, i.e. have been
regarded as binding—they fall into those categories [quoting A and B]. .
. . Those then become the two base situations. Now as to those, the class
action is essential. . . . As to those I think under the existing law it is
binding, but if it isn’t it should be. . . .
Therefore, when we take class (2), which are said to be the segregation
cases, I am satisfied from extensive correspondence with Professor
152
and a
Wright and extensive conference with Judge Skelly Wright,
review of the cases, that the integration cases need to be class actions. .
. . But I believe they can be wholly subsumed by sections (A) and (B) of
part (1). In other words, these can be treated, I think, as varying
adjudications which would establish incompatible standards of conduct
etc.—if one Negro is let in and another is held back. I think that by a
153
beefy note on that score we can cover that under (1)(A) adequately.

Reporter Benjamin Kaplan and Committee Member Charles Alan
151. Letter from Charles Alan Wright to Benjamin Kaplan (Mar. 30, 1963), in RECORDS OF THE
U.S. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, supra note 29, microformed on CIS No. CI-7001, 13, 15 (Cong. Info.
Serv.).
152. Judge Skelly Wright was appointed by President Kennedy to serve on the United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia. Wright grew up in New Orleans where he attended all-white
public high schools. He went on to become a “pioneer in the desegregation of public schools and
public transportation in his native New Orleans.” Marjorie Hunter, Judge J. Skelly Wright,
Segregation Foe Dies at 77, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 8, 1988), http://www.nytimes.com/
1988/08/08/obituaries/judge-j-skelly-wright-segregation-foe-dies-at-77.html. Judge Wright’s advice
to the Advisory Committee was informed by his own expertise and experience involving
desegregation. As Marjorie Hunter notes “In the months after his order to integrate the public schools
in New Orleans in 1960, Judge Wright was shunned by old friends. A cross was burned on the lawn
of his home. Telephone threats against his life became so numerous that police guards were assigned
to protect him.” Id.
153. Transcript of Sessions on Class Actions–EE, supra note 29, at 32 (emphasis and paragraph
break added).
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Wright balked at the notion that civil rights cases could be shoehorned into
a (b)(1) class, noting the ease with which those opposed to integration
could defeat class certification. Kaplan responded to Frank at the Civil
Rules Meeting as follows:
Well, I would consider the elimination of those lines [re: (b)(2)] to be so
retrograde a move that I don’t think we could go to the public with a rule
so truncated. To take your first point first, John [Frank], you are saying
that in your view the ordinary desegregation case can be read under
(1)(A) or (B). Let me make first the observation that if by any chance
the desegregation case could be found by a judge not to be a class action
after the adoption of the rule, we would of course be in a very, very bad
way. If there is any doubt on the matter, we certainly ought to carry
language which includes the desegregation suit. So, if there be any
question about it, (2) ought to remain in.
Second, I don’t think the desegregation case is covered by either (1)(A)
or (B), because I think that the cases leave open the distinct possibility
that a Negro child may apply on his own behalf for admission to school
and would be entitled to a decree in his favor alone. I don’t think that a
series of such suits would create “inconsistent or varying adjudications
establishing incompatible standards of conduct” by the Board. There are
plenty of Boards who would be very happy to be engaged in what you
call “incompatible standards of conduct.” Nor do I think that an
adjudication with respect to an individual (this is (B)) would be decisive
of the issues of the class. Now the cases suggest that this argument
stands on the proposition that we have not got a law which says, as you
seem to suggest it says, that an individual Negro student cannot maintain
an action on his own. So on all scores it seems to me that (2) must remain
in to make it absolutely clear that desegregation cases—and (2) is not
confined to deseg. but that can be taken as characteristic—to make sure
154
that those cases are covered.

Wright made the same objections, flagging the propensity of local
school boards and judges to successfully defeat and deny class
certification based on a “divide and conquer” approach:
Mr. Chairman, John [Frank] has again in his motion given what seem to
me two very different problems. On (2) I feel so strongly that he is wrong
that once you agree, as he does, that segregation cases must be
prosecuted as class actions (as certainly they must) you have to have (2)
to take care of them. It is simply torturing language to say that they
involve “incompatible standards of conduct” and come under (1)(A).
The proof of that I think is in the action of several Boards: the Fort Worth
School Board in the case of [redacted], which said Yes, we’ll take
[redacted], but we don’t want the order to require us to take other
154.

Id. at 33–34 (emphasis and paragraph break added).
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Negroes. They found nothing incompatible. The Clemson Board of
Trustees, after they had already admitted Gantt, petitioned for certiorari
unsuccessfully to have the class action aspects stricken from the decree.
Or you can look to the decree which the district judge actually entered in
Baily v. Paterson in Miss. after they had once won the case in the
Supreme Court, and the decree was entered providing that the bus
company must transport the three named plaintiffs without
discrimination, but it could [illegible] to refuse all other Negroes. These
people opposing the class don’t find it incompatible.
I don’t think it is incompatible. So I think we must take care of these
cases. I don’t see that (2) is open to the dangers to which John [Frank]
155
adverts, which I think may be very real dangers in (3).

In rejecting desegregation cases for Rule 23(b)(1) certification, the
Committee members considered a number of cases, including Brunson and
Potts, discussed supra, which illustrated the type of strong resistance to
desegregation post-Brown and the course corrections needed.156
Tellingly, much of the Committee’s criticism over potential
amendments to Rule 23 was targeted to provision (b)(3). Rule 23(b)(3)
allows a class action to be maintained where “the court finds that the
questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any
questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is
superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating
the controversy.”157 This catch-all provision would bind classes far less
cohesive than those contemplated under provisions (b)(1) and (b)(2), held
together for convenience and efficiency brought about by the
predominance of common questions. Many “spurious” classes and those
involving money damages could be accommodated by the (b)(3)
provision.
There was more consensus among the rulemakers that provision (b)(3)
broke new ground and risked opening a Pandora’s box that could not be
closed.158 To the extent that the rulemakers perceived this risk as bleeding
155. Id. at 35 (emphasis and paragraph breaks added).
156. Memorandum from B.K. (Benjamin Kaplan) and A.M.S. (Albert M. Sacks), supra note 150,
at 21 (“Our proposed Rule 23(b)(2) (pp. EE–1-2), intended to reach a group of cases including the
segregation cases, is supported with particular cogency by the opinions in Brunson v. Board of
Trustees of School District No. 1 of Clarendon County, S. C., 311 F. 2d 107 (4th Cir. 1962), and Potts
v. Flax, 313 F.2d 284 (5th Cir. 1963) (both cited at p. EE–12), on which Professor Wright distributed
a memorandum dated February 16, 1963. Please note that certiorari was denied in Brunson on May
27, 1963, 83 Sup. Ct. 1538. See also Gantt v. Clemson Ag. College of S.C., 6 F.R. Serv. 2d 23a.33,
case 8 (4th Cir. 1963).”).
157. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).
158. See Carroll, supra note 95, at 861–63 (describing the controversial nature of the (b)(3)
provision and reticence among the drafters to include it in the modern class action rule).
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over into provision (b)(2), they were critical of both provisions. John P.
Frank, in particular, seemed to conflate the two provisions, criticizing both
in the same breath, despite their very different nature.159
For example, Committee Member Frank sought to reign in what he
saw as unbridled judicial discretion to certify cases under (b)(2) and
(b)(3),160 believing that this could lead to an abuse of power:
My opposition to divisions (2) and (3) is that they put no limit but the sky
to class actions, leaving the entire matter to discretion in the particular
case. It must be remembered that despite the excellent notice provisions
of the Rule, this is a discretion which must be exercised in the dark so
far as the court is concerned. The possibility of put-up jobs in strike suits
161
is tremendous.
I find nothing at all substantial in the materials . . .
indicating any particular necessity for this wide open area.
I would far rather take the excellent revision as you have it without these
162
open door provisions and give them ten years for development.

To the extent that Frank’s disapproval applied to the (b)(3) class, his
colleagues shared his reservations. For example, in a March 30, 1963
letter from Committee Member Charles Alan Wright to Reporter
Benjamin Kaplan, Wright remarked:
John Frank’s proposal to drop subdivisions (2) and (3) of Rule 23(b) is
not, at first blush, persuasive to me. . . . I would be delighted to drop all
163
of (b), but oppose dropping (b)(2). On (b)(3) I am dubitante.

At the October 31st to November 2nd, 1963 Civil Rules Meeting,
Frank—while recognizing the importance of desegregation class
actions—reiterated his disapproval of (b)(2) along with (b)(3):
As to the rest of it, namely part (2), and part (3) I myself do not believe
it is at all necessary or proper to have class actions at all. Remember
always that these are binding, because we have eliminated the nonbinding class action. I do not think that there is anything really worth
doing under (2) or (3) that we cannot consume under (1)(A) or (B)
159. See generally id. (describing this conflation in the modern context).
160. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
161. This refers to a pre-arranged lawsuit brought by plaintiffs to encourage settlement by the
defendant where it would cost the latter less to settle than to litigate the case. This concern would
seem to fit proposed Rule 23(b)(3) more than (b)(2).
162. Letter from John Frank to Benjamin Kaplan (Mar. 22, 1963), in RECORDS OF THE U.S.
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, supra note 29, microformed on CIS No. CI-7001, 9, 11 (Cong. Info. Serv.)
(emphasis added).
163. Letter from Charles Alan Wright to Benjamin Kaplan (Mar. 30, 1963), supra note 151, at
15 (emphasis added).
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adequately, because I am so genuinely concerned about the interference
with individual liberty and the possibility of fraud. I do not wish to see
the class action made any more useful and usable than it has to be. . . .
Mr. Chairman, to conclude, I believe that the social values involved by
allowing sections (2) and (3) to become class actions at all, despite the
isolated instances which are suggested, are far less valuable
contributions than the detriment that comes from opening the doors to
those practices and depriving those people of their rights. And I
therefore would move to delete [the language of Rule 23(b)(2) and
164
(b)(3)] of the proposal.

At that Civil Rules Meeting, Committee members distinguished (b)(2)
from (b)(3) in their response to Frank. For example, Kaplan explained:
When I spoke of a truncated rule being retrograde, I had in mind very
much classification (3). . . . I grant you that the class action has to be
carefully handled, but what closer safeguards can we provide than the
ones we have. So I would very much hope that we would not excise
either of these categories [(b)(2) or (b)(3)]. I think it’s of the utmost
165
importance that they be preserved.

Another example is Wright’s reaction:
So I think we must take care of these cases. I don’t see that (2) is open
to the dangers to which John [Frank] adverts, which I think may be very
166
real dangers in (3).

While there are genuine differences between (b)(2) and (b)(3) classes,
Reporter Kaplan argued that the former could not exist without the latter.
In an exchange with Committee Members Frank and Wright at the fall
1963 Civil Rules Meeting, Reporter Kaplan posited that both provisions
are necessary for the greater good:
Mr. Frank: Mr. Chairman, may I explain. . . . [W]hat’s in [(b)](3) now,
that’s as [Associate Reporter] Al[bert Sacks] has suggested, largely the
present spurious class action, and they aren’t res judicata now. So what
we’re doing here is working a plain revolution, because we’re taking
actions which would not have been res judicata and we’re making them
res judicata.
Kaplan: Now John [Frank], the very desegregation suits that are now
being conducted are theoretically spurious class actions, but there isn’t

164. Transcript of Sessions on Class Actions–EE, supra note 29, at 32–33 (emphasis and
paragraph break added).
165. Id. at 34 (emphasis added).
166. Id. at 35 (emphasis added).
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a judge in the world that’s treating them that way, nor should they be
treated that way.
Mr. Frank: But we must separate those. You and Charlie [Wright] feel
that is a section (2) problem. We’re confining ourselves at the moment
to section (3).
Kaplan: But I’m saying that the same thing is carrying over. We are in
the midst of a very important development which will enable courts to
deal with diffuse litigation, and when you put a negative to (b)(3) you
are chopping off that development with a knife, and let’s be perfectly
clear that that’s what’s being done. I say that it is incredible to me that
we can go forward with a revision of the class suit rule and chop that
167
development off and make it suitable. I don’t see it. It’s not possible.

For Frank, that (b)(2) and (b)(3) were so intertwined was a bridge too
far. In a painful example, he illustrates the purported futility of (b)(3) in a
legal system that already offers alternative options for resolving
duplicative litigation outside of aggregation:
168

In my state, Judge Wyzanski —I regret to say this—we kill an awful
lot of Mexicans, and we do it by hauling them around in busses that are
wholly inadequate. We had seventeen killed in our state in one accident;
California had 27 not so long ago. These become compensatory cases,
but we’ve had great success (particularly under Judge Boldt, a member
of our central Committee, who came down and handled one of them)
using devices which weren’t class actions, didn’t sacrifice anybody’s
rights, but on the other hand were damned efficient, and we moved them
through, and with a little pushing he got four sample cases and they
moved those and accepted those results and we were done with them. . .
. I confess that I am now ready to vote yes on all the rule except (3),
169
tighten (2), and go home and be happy.

In recognition of the importance of creating an aggregate vehicle for
desegregation cases in particular, Frank ultimately yielded to the inclusion
of (b)(2). Although Frank is an outlier in his view over which vehicle is
best suited for civil rights enforcement, he shared the Committee’s
commitment in providing one.170 His concern was over the scope of
(b)(2)’s coverage, not its civil rights objective:

167. Id. at 41 (emphasis added).
168. For background on Judge Wyzanski, see Eric Pace, Charles E. Wyzasnki, 80, is Dead; Judge
on U.S. Court for 45 Years, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 5, 1986), http://www.nytimes.com/1986/09/05/
obituaries/charles-e-wyzanski-80-is-dead-judge-on-us-court-for-45-years.html (noting he “won wide
note with rulings on issues large and small in the 1960’s and the Vietnam War era”).
169. Transcript of Sessions on Class Actions–EE, supra note 29, at 51 (emphasis added).
170. See also id. at 61 (emphasis added) (Advisory Committee Member Judge Roszel C.
Thomsen: “We certainly want (2) to cover the segregation cases.”).
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Lines 25 to 28 [covering Rule 23(b)(2)] are included here because of the
belief that they are needed to be sure that we cover the segregation case.
I do not personally believe that to be so, in the sense that I believe that
they can be perfectly adequately covered above; however, opinions that
I am bound to respect come to the contrary conclusion, and so I yield the
point, because certainly we want the segregation cases covered
somewhere here.
However, in the course of covering the segregation cases, we have in
lines 25–28, I think, covered the universe as well. The party opposing
the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to
the class, thereby making—in other words, for that reason—making
appropriate specific or declaratory final relief with respect to the class as
a whole. Now, that covers the segregation cases alright, but it also
covers matters which almost everybody in this room doesn’t have the
faintest wish to cover, because this also in terms covers mass accidents.
In any case of a mass accident where the asserted negligent party refuses
to act, i.e., refuses to pay on grounds generally applicable to the class; to
wit, denial of negligence, thereby we have a more than plausible, we
have a probably interpretation that this covers that. It covers, in short,
any conceivable refusal on the part of anybody to refuse to do what a
large number of persons wish done, and that, it seems to me, is no
possible basis for depriving individual American citizens of their rights
171
to independent trials by itself.

After much hard work and careful thought, the civil rights provision
of the modern class action rule—Rule 23(b)(2)—was approved.172 Even
in his dissenting view, Frank applauded the goals achieved by the modern
class rule:
[P]arts (b)(1) and (2) absorb the former true and hybrid class actions;
(b)(2) picks up the contemporary use of class actions in the race relations
cases; and section (c)(2) makes judgments in these cases binding on the
class. The revision also greatly improves the devices to protect the class
173
from abuse. For these improvements, I applaud.

Ultimately, Committee Member Frank could not embrace the most
controversial aspect of the modern aggregation rule174—the Rule 23(b)(3)
171. Id. at 60–61 (emphasis and paragraph breaks added).
172. See Order Approving Amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 383 U.S. 1031
(1966).
173. Advisory Committee on Civil Rules Dissenting View of Committee Member John P. Frank
(May 28, 1965), supra note 142, at 2 (emphasis added).
174. John P. Frank, Response to 1996 Circulation of Proposed Rule 23 on Class Actions, supra
note 22, at 267 (“As a member of the committee, I dissented from the (b)(3) portion of the rule . . . .”);
id. (“[T]he most sharply disputed question was whether to have Rule (b)(3) at all.”).
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catch-all.175 His partial Dissent focuses on this provision:
But having done so much good, the Rule proceeds to go an unnecessary
and undesirable extra mile. By section (b)(3) the Rule absorbs the old,
spurious class action, and section (c)(2) makes this also binding on the
class. At this point a majority of my brothers and I part company. . . . I
would therefore delete section (b)(3) and the related portion of section
(c)(2) [making the class judgment binding] for . . . reasons [including . .
. t]he corruption potential of the binding spurious class action intimidates
me. These cases are terribly easy to rig—a bright child could do it. I
176
would not hold out the bait.

Rule 23(b)(3) eventually passed muster because of a rule provision
that allowed class members to opt-out of a (b)(3) class.177 While this
opportunity for self-exclusion did not satisfy Frank,178 it gave sufficient
comfort to other previously skeptical Committee members.179 Reporter
Kaplan concluded that (b)(3) was an important step forward:
This [Rule 23(b)(3)] in fact is a growing point in the law. This is the
situation that ought to be covered, left to some extent to the discretion of
the court. As we all know, cases involving large numbers of persons are

175. See Letter from B.K. (Benjamin Kaplan) and A.M.S. (Albert M. Sacks) (Jan. 31, 1964),
supra note 141, at 6–7, 11(“With respect to the (b)(1) and (b)(2) categories, Mr. Frank is reluctantly
willing to see the individual’s liberty somewhat limited, but he balks at (b)(3), which he views as a
kind of luxury category that is not really necessary or important.”).
176. Advisory Committee on Civil Rules Dissenting View of Committee Member John P. Frank
(May 28, 1965), supra note 142, at 2–3 (paragraph breaks omitted).
177. Current Rule 23(c)(2)(B) states:
For (b)(3) Classes. For any class certified under Rule 23(b)(3), the court must direct to
class members the best notice that is practicable under the circumstances, including
individual notice to all members who can be identified through reasonable effort. The
notice must clearly and concisely state in plain, easily understood language: . . .
(v) that the court will exclude from the class any member who requests exclusion;
....
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B).
178. Advisory Committee on Civil Rules Dissenting View of Committee Member John P. Frank
(May 28, 1965), supra note 142, at 4 (“That if the individual [in a (b)(3) class] knows of the action, he
can ‘opt out’ by disclaimer gives me zero comfort.”).
179. Frank describes how the opt-out resolved the (b)(3) problem:
It was at that moment that committee member Judge Charles Wyzanski had his flash of
genius. He responded to Professor Moore, “Would you be satisfied, Professor Moore, if
the class could never include anybody who specifically protests within a given period?”
Professor Moore responded, “That would be helpful” and the principal opponent of (b)(3)
added, “If that were done, my problem would evaporate.” . . . [T]he rule was adopted . . . .
John P. Frank, Response to 1996 Circulation of Proposed Rule 23 on Class Actions, supra note 22, at
269–70.
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more and more almost the staple of federal litigation. It is at this point
180
that we make an advance.

In sum, the drafters of the modern class action rule were unwavering
in their commitment to create a procedural mechanism for the enforcement
of civil rights, as illustrated by their deliberations.181 Creation of the
modern Rule 23’s civil rights provision went on to become a procedural
force with which to be reckoned.
III. MAJOR TRENDS IN RULE 23(B)(2) JURISPRUDENCE OVER THE LAST
FIFTY YEARS
A. The Heyday of Civil Rights Class Actions
Modern Rule 23’s civil rights provision, coupled with the historic
Civil Rights Act of 1964, empowered ordinary people to achieve
extraordinary outcomes through the court system. Fueled by public
interest litigation and the growth of statutory rights and constitutional
claims, federal courts certified civil rights cases impacting broad classes
and providing far-reaching relief.182 Civil rights class actions were
brought to challenge all manner of segregation and discrimination in areas
such as education, housing, public accommodations, and employment.183
Employment discrimination class actions under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 typified the law enforcement role of Rule 23(b)(2) in
the 1960s and 1970s.184 Pursuant to this rule, the federal courts regularly
certified cases enjoining broad discriminatory policies and individually
180. Transcript of Sessions on Class Actions–EE, supra note 29, at 25.
181. In coming to a resolution over including (b)(2), the drafters also wrestled with the propriety
of money damages being available under the provision. Although the rule is silent on the issue, they
concluded in the accompanying note that so long as money damages did not predominate, it was
permissible. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2) advisory committee’s notes to 1966 amendment (“The
subdivision does not extend to cases in which the appropriate final relief relates exclusively or
predominantly to money damages.”).
182. See, e.g., Marcus, History of the Modern Class Action, supra note 28, at 639–40; Greenberg,
supra note 39, at 585 (“In . . . prisoners’ rights, school desegregation, and employment
discrimination—class actions have played a vital role. They have made it possible to afford relief to
large numbers of persons who, realistically, could not have been parties to litigation.”); see also id. at
581 (describing broad remedies in school desegregation cases that typified the early 1970s).
183. Greenberg, supra note 39, at 576 (discussing the “critical role” class action has played in
civil rights litigation); 7AA WRIGHT, supra note 29, § 1776 nn. 6–9 (“Rule 23(b)(2) has been invoked
in a wide range of civil rights contexts: suits arising out of alleged race and sex discrimination in
employment; in school and housing desegregation or discrimination suits.”) (citing cases).
184. See Greenberg, supra note 39, at 583 (“Class actions have played a major role in
employment discrimination litigation.”); id. (surmising that “establishing the propriety of class relief
had a high priority” for courts).
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compensating employees for back pay—because of its equitable nature.185
Indeed, the first Title VII case heard by the Supreme Court in 1966
affirmed the availability of class treatment to counter employment
discrimination under the statute.186
Moreover, during this time period, courts allowed “across-the-board”
class actions—enabling named plaintiffs challenging one discriminatory
practice to represent broadly other groups and to challenge other practices
under the umbrella of a single class action.187 Some courts did not bother
to determine if the Rule 23(b) criteria had been satisfied, concluding that
aggregation was appropriate for cases enjoining segregation and
discrimination.188
Class actions also spearheaded a broader conception of civil litigation
that resulted in expansive injunctive relief and systemic reform to major
institutions such as prisons, foster care and public welfare.189 The
traditional model of “bipolar litigation between two private parties, in
which the remedy is retrospective and self-contained” had to give way to
a model that joined multiple parties with public and private interests, in
which the remedy was forward-looking and extensive.190
Prison reform is illustrative.191 Efforts to reform “large, inefficient,
abusive, unconstitutional prison systems” that had been stymied for
decades were green-lighted through aggregate litigation.192 In 1968, for
example, the Supreme Court held in Lee v. Washington that racial
185. Suzette M. Malveaux, Class Actions at the Crossroads: An Answer to Wal-Mart v. Dukes,
5 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 375, 391–96 (2011) [hereinafter Malveaux, Crossroads] (describing how
back pay, as an equitable remedy, was regularly available in a (b)(2) class action).
186. See Greenberg, supra note 39, at 583 (referring to Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S.
147 (1982)).
187. Marcus, History of the Modern Class Action, supra note 28, at 641–43.
188. See 7AA WRIGHT, supra note 29, § 1776 & n.14 (citing cases).
189. See id., § 1776 & n.10 (noting that “Rule 23(b)(2) has been invoked in a wide range of civil
rights contexts: . . . in actions challenging public-welfare statutes or regulations as discriminatory” and
citing cases); Edward F. Sherman, Introduction to the Symposium: Complex Litigation: Plagued by
Concerns Over Federalism, Jurisdiction and Fairness, 37 AKRON L. REV. 589, 591 (2004) (citing
cases).
190. Greenberg, supra note 39, at 576–77. Jack Greenberg, citing the work of Professor Abram
Chayes, describes the shift as follows: “Courts of equity have come to enter more broadly based
decrees; the remedies have shifted from one-shot, one-way transfers to compensate for past wrongs,
to decrees adjusting future behavior.” Id. at 576 (citing Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in
Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1291 (1976)).
191. Greenberg, supra note 39, at 577 (“Class actions have played a major role in securing the
rights of prisoners. Since the federal class action rule was revised in 1966, prisoner rights litigation
has utilized the mechanism of class action to bring broad relief to inmates and detainees throughout
the country.”).
192. Id. at 576; see also id. at 577–78 (describing various rights advocated on behalf of prisoners
in the class action context).
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segregation of prisoners was a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.193
The injunctive and declaratory relief was not cabined to only the specific
prisoners challenging segregation, but rather covered all prisoners in the
Alabama penal system.194 Aggregation did what stare decisis could do,
but with far less expenditure of judicial resources and lawsuits.195
Aggregation also did what stare decisis failed to do.196 The Second
Circuit’s holding in Marcera v. Chinlund197 illustrates this.198 Although
the court had in at least three prior class actions determined pre-trial
detainees’ rights to contact visits, the relief was cabined to those particular
prisoners in those particular prisons.199 Marcera expanded the scope of
relief to a class of prisoners state-wide, putting an end to piecemeal,
seriatim enforcement and relief.200 Not surprisingly, the class action
device became a popular tool for major prison reform where constitutional
violations were clearly established.201
In sum, the combination of Congress’s prolific creation of statutory
rights coupled with the federal judiciary’s robust certification of systemic,
injunctive civil rights cases resulted in a heyday of impactful civil rights
litigation.
B. Retraction of Civil Rights Aggregation and the Damages Conundrum
This heyday would not last forever. The perfect storm of statutory
construction of rights and procedural access to aggregation in the courts
started to calm in the late 1970s.202 The pendulum began to swing towards
a more cabined approach as the Supreme Court reined in robust
certification of civil rights cases.203
193. Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333, 334 (1968).
194. Greenberg, supra note 39, at 578.
195. Id.
196. See id. (“Stare decisis did not seem to be operating.”).
197. Marcera v. Chinlund, 595 F.2d 1231, 1242 (2d Cir. 1979), vacated, Lombard v. Marcera,
442 U.S. 915 (1979).
198. Greenberg, supra note 39, at 578.
199. Marcera, 595 F.2d at 1234–35.
200. Greenberg, supra note 39, at 578.
201. Id. (“Prisoners’ rights litigation came to use the class action mechanism frequently and to
the fullest extent possible.); see also Marcera, 595 F.2d at 1240 (rejecting judicial administrative
inconvenience and federalism concerns as justifications for “excus[ing] a failure to remedy clear
constitutional violations”).
202. See Greenberg, supra note 39, at 579–84.
203. Having said that, in 1984, “civil rights class actions represented 37.3% of all class action
suits—the largest of any single category.” Greenberg, supra note 39, at 576 (citing Angelo N.
Ancheta, Defendant Class Actions and Federal Civil Rights Litigation, 33 UCLA L. REV. 283, 330
n.2 (1985)).
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More specifically, while recognizing that “suits alleging racial or
ethnic discrimination are often by their very nature class suits, involving
classwide wrongs,” the Court’s 1977 decision in East Texas Motor Freight
System, Inc. v. Rodriguez cautioned that “careful attention to the
requirements of [Rule 23] remains nonetheless indispensable.”204 In that
vein, in 1982, the Court, in General Telephone Co. of the Southwest v.
Falcon, rebuked the “across-the-board” approach in an employment
discrimination case.205 That is, a victim of racial discrimination could no
longer attack all unequal employment practices “across-the-board” that
were subject to an employer’s policy. Instead, the Court held that class
representatives had to be members of the class they sought to represent
and had to “possess the same interest and suffer the same injury” of class
members.206 In Falcon, the Court held that where an employee alleged
that he had been denied a promotion on account of being MexicanAmerican, he could not adequately represent a class of Mexican-American
applicants who were not hired on account of similar discrimination.207
Falcon marked a turning point; the Court made clear that a naked
allegation of race discrimination in employment was no longer the sine
qua non for class certification.208 Instead, certification of a Title VII
employment discrimination case was contingent upon a “rigorous
analysis” of the Rule 23 criteria.209
Following Falcon, the number of employment discrimination class
actions filed in federal court dropped precipitously. For example, in 1976,
1174 employment discrimination class actions were filed in federal
court.210 By 1991, that number had dropped to thirty-two.211 Retreat of
204. E. Tex. Motor Freight Sys., Inc. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395, 405 (1977). In Rodriguez, the
Court reversed class certification on the grounds that the named plaintiffs were inadequate
representatives because they were not members of the class. Id. at 403–04. Mexican-American city
truck drivers who were not qualified to be line drivers did not suffer injury and thus could not represent
a class of those African-American and Mexican-Americans who were so qualified. Id. at 396, 398–
400, 403–05. The Court reiterated that the “mere fact that a complaint alleges racial or ethnic
discrimination does not in itself ensure that the party who has brought the lawsuit will be an adequate
representative of those who may have been the real victims of that discrimination.” Id. at 405–06.
205. Gen. Tel. Co. of the Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 160 (1982).
206. Id. at 156 (quoting Rodriguez, 431 U.S. at 403).
207. Id. at 149, 158–59.
208. Id. at 157; see also id. at 159 (“If one allegation of specific discriminatory treatment were
sufficient to support an across-the-board attack, every Title VII case would be a potential
companywide class action. We find nothing in the statute to indicate that Congress intended to
authorize such a wholesale expansion of class-action litigation.”).
209. Id. at 161.
210. Melissa Hart, Will Employment Discrimination Class Actions Survive?, 37 AKRON L. REV.
813, 820 (2004).
211. Id.
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the public interest movement and growth of corporate political power led
to fewer Title VII class actions being used as a conduit for social change.
By the late 1990s and early 2000s, the number of employment
discrimination class actions increased slightly, leveling off at seventythree to eighty-five annually.212 This uptick was due, in part, to the
enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1991,213 which amended the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.214
The Civil Rights Act of 1991 responded to a number of 1989 Supreme
Court cases viewed as hostile to civil rights enforcement.215 One of those
was Martin v. Wilks,216 which dealt with the scope of relief a court could
provide in a class action. In this case, African-American firefighters
brought a class action alleging employment discrimination in pay and
promotions.217 The parties settled the case and the court issued a consent
decree with an affirmative action plan that resulted in some White
firefighters not being appointed.218 The latter contended that the decree
discriminated against them and improperly bound them as non-parties in
the prior case.219 The Supreme Court ruled in their favor.220 Congress—
in a rare show of overwhelming support221—overruled Wilks in the Civil
Rights Act of 1991.222 In a nutshell, where the White firefighters had
notice and an opportunity to be heard, and adequate representation in the
prior class action, they could be bound to the class decree without being
parties.223
In addition to reversing a number of unfavorable civil rights rulings,
the 1991 Act amended the 1964 Act to promote greater deterrence of

212. Id.
213. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2012); see Greenberg, supra note 39, at 584 (noting in 1997 that
“employment . . . class actions of considerable scope continue to be filed”); id. at 585 (noting that in
1997, employment discrimination cases “classes [were] becoming larger, back pay relief [was]
increasing dramatically, and the Civil Rights Act of 1991 [was] restoring the gains of previous
litigation.”).
214. Hart, supra note 210, at 813.
215. Id. at 825; Greenberg, supra note 39, at 584 (“The Civil Rights Act of 1991 overturned
Martin v. Wilks and various other decisions which curtailed the scope of Title VII.”).
216. 490 U.S. 755 (1989).
217. Id. at 759.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 760–61.
220. Id. at 761–64.
221. See Greenberg, supra note 39, at 584 (“[T]he Act was passed by the largest margin of any
civil rights statute in American history, with eighty-nine percent of Congress voting in favor.”).
222. Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 108, 105 Stat. 1071, 1076 (1991) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e2(n)(1)(B)).
223. Greenberg, supra note 39, at 584.
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harassment and intentional discrimination.224 This course correction
included providing compensatory and punitive damages and a right to a
jury trial in employment cases alleging intentional discrimination.225
Although designed to promote greater civil rights enforcement, the
1991 Act had the unintended consequence of creating division among the
federal circuit courts of appeals over the availability of monetary damages
for Rule 23(b)(2) classes.226 Although all of the circuits that considered
the issue concluded that monetary relief was permissible so long as it did
not predominate over the injunctive and declaratory relief sought,227 the
appellate courts used different tests when determining predominance.228
This split made some circuits less amenable to certifying Title VII cases
seeking monetary damages under Rule 23(b)(2).
The more rigorous certification approach was promoted by the Fifth
Circuit in Allison v. Citgo, which conditioned certification on monetary
damages being incidental to the injunctive or declaratory relief sought.229
Damages had to “flow directly from liability to the class as a whole.”230
Applying this stringent standard, the court concluded that the
compensatory and punitive damages sought required individualized proof,
and were therefore not incidental, and Rule 23(b)(2) certification was
denied.231 The Seventh and Eleventh Circuits likewise adopted this
approach.232
In contrast, the Ninth Circuit opted for a more flexible ad hoc
balancing approach to the Fifth Circuit’s bright-line test.233 The Second
Circuit’s Robinson v. Metro-North decision emphasized lower court
discretion and determined whether the weight or value of the injunctive
and declaratory relief predominated over the monetary damages from the

224. Hart, supra note 210, at 826.
225. Id. at 813–14, 826.
226. Suzette M. Malveaux, How Goliath Won: The Future Implications of Dukes v. Wal-Mart,
106 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 34, 49–50 (2011); 7A WRIGHT, supra note 16, § 1776, at 93–94; see
also 7A WRIGHT, supra note 16, § 1784.1.
227. See Greenberg, supra note 39, at 828.
228. Id. at 830.
229. Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402, 415 (5th Cir. 1998).
230. Id. (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2)).
231. Id. at 418. This conclusion also meant that Rule 23(b)(3) certification was not appropriate
because individualized questions predominated over common ones, in contravention of this rule’s
requirements. Id. at 420; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).
232. See Murray v. Auslander, 244 F.3d 807, 812 (11th Cir. 2001); Jefferson v. Ingersoll Int’l
Inc., 195 F.3d 894, 898 (7th Cir. 1999).
233. See Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 603 F.3d 571, 616 (9th Cir. 2010), rev’d, 564 U.S. 338
(2011).
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plaintiffs’ eye.234 Other courts took a compromised position, choosing to
allow hybrid certification.235 For example, a court might certify class-wide
liability under Rule 23(b)(2) and individual monetary damages under Rule
23(b)(3).236
The Supreme Court ultimately resolved the issue, adopting the
incidental test, even where plaintiffs sought back pay under Rule
23(b)(2).237 In Wal-Mart v. Dukes, the Court concluded that since the back
pay had to be determined on an individualized basis, rather than
formulaically, the monetary relief was not incidental and Rule 23(b)(2)
certification was not allowed.238
This ruling has the effect of funneling much of employment
discrimination class actions seeking monetary, in addition to injunctive,
relief from 23(b)(2) to 23(b)(3) consideration239—a higher bar to clear.240
Consequently, the civil rights class action rule born of the 1960s—i.e.,
(b)(2)—is less likely to be home to litigants seeking systemic change if
they are also seeking monetary relief.
In sum, following the civil rights movement, the next couple of
decades were marked by the Supreme Court’s reining in aggregate
litigation as a readily available procedural tool for addressing racial and
other inequality on a wide scale. Litigants could no longer sweep with as
broad a brush over discriminatory practices and actors as before. This
retraction would continue into the next century, but with more attention
than ever to the class action device.
C. Contemporary Challenges to Combatting Systemic Discrimination in
234. Robinson v. Metro-N. Commuter R.R., 267 F.3d 147, 164 (2d Cir. 2001).
235. Hart, supra note 210, at 829–30.
236. Id. at 824.
237. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 366 (2011). The courts have historically
recognized the importance of back pay as a prophylactic for employment discrimination and an
incentive for voluntary compliance with Title VII. Greenberg, supra note 39, at 584 (citing Albemarle
Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 421 (1975)).
238. Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 362–63.
239. See John C. Coffee, Jr. & Alexandra D. Lahav, Battered but Unbowed: A 2016 Update on
Class Actions, in THE 20TH ANNUAL NATIONAL INSTITUTE ON CLASS ACTIONS D1, D-21 (A.B.A.
2016), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/events/cle/2016/10/ce1610cac/ce1610caccor.
authcheckdam.pdf.
240. Suzette M. Malveaux, The Power and Promise of Procedure: Examining the Class Action
Landscape After Wal-Mart v. Dukes, 62 DEPAUL L. REV. 659, 667, 671 (2013); Malveaux, A Diamond
in the Rough, supra note 98, at 501–04 (describing Rule 23(b)(3) obstacles); see also, e.g., FED. R.
CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B). The heightened notice requirement, for example, makes a Rule 23(b)(3) class
potentially more expensive. Moreover, the requirement that common questions predominate over
individual ones and that a class action be superior to other procedural approaches also makes Rule
23(b)(3) potentially more difficult to satisfy.
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the Aggregate
The twentieth century has ushered in a renewed interest in civil
procedure and aggregate litigation with the swearing in of Chief Justice
John G. Roberts, Jr.241 Over the past decade, the Supreme Court has
grappled with an exceptional number of class actions.242
There are several possible reasons for this. The uptick in certiorari
grants in the field may be explained by the fact that aggregation issues
have had ample time to ripen into circuit splits and to reveal their
importance to the long game.243 Significantly, the inordinate volume may
be explained by a greater number of class actions in the federal pipeline
due to the more recent discretionary availability of interlocutory review of
certification orders under Rule 23(f),244 and enhanced federal jurisdiction
over major class actions under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA).245
Some have attributed the growth to the composition of the Court itself,
noting the Justices’ backgrounds in litigating federal cases and teaching
civil procedure, their politics,246 and their capacity to effect procedural
change relative to the rulemaking process and Congress.247
This recent re-awakening of class action jurisprudence over the past
ten years248 has had mixed results for litigants challenging systemic
discrimination. This section examines the Supreme Court’s use of
worthiness as a screen for class certification,249 deference towards the
enforceability of class action waivers, and policing of statutory,
constitutional and evidentiary doorways to the civil litigation system.
These broad areas provide a window into understanding how the Court’s
contemporary jurisprudence impacts litigants’ ability to effectively
challenge systemic discrimination using Rule 23(b)(2) today.250
241. Howard M. Wasserman, The Roberts Court and the Civil Procedure Revival, 31 REV. LITIG.
313, 314 (2012).
242. Id. at 314–15.
243. See id. at 338–45.
244. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f). Rule 23 was amended in 1998 to allow such discretionary
interlocutory review. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f) advisory committee’s note to 1998 amendments.
245. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005) (codified in
scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
246. Wasserman, supra note 241, at 330–32.
247. Id. at 333–34.
248. Id. at 314–15.
249. This article does not examine the Court’s treatment of the merits in cases involving other
substantive areas of law, such as securities and antitrust.
250. For example, issue certification and ascertainability are issues percolating in the courts
below. See Chad R. Fuller et al., A Serious Circuit Split on Class Ascertainability, LAW360 (June 30,
2016,
4:42
PM),
https://www.law360.com/articles/813021/a-serious-circuit-split-on-class-
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1. Worthiness as a Screen: The Consideration of Merits at Class
Certification
The Court’s insistence that judges conduct a demanding analysis of
the propriety of aggregation has clearly calcified. Nowhere is that more
apparent than in the Court’s treatment of the merits at the class
certification stage. Although judges are not permitted to condition
certification on whether the putative class will ultimately prevail, they are
free to consider the merits to the extent that they overlap with the
certification criteria.251 This overlapping determination of the elements of
a cause of action and the elements of Rule 23 has firmly taken root, putting
to rest any doubt initially created by Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin.252 In
1974, Eisen made clear that it was not appropriate to condition class
certification on a case’s probability of success:
We find nothing in either the language or history of Rule 23 that gives a
court any authority to conduct a preliminary inquiry into the merits of a
suit in order to determine whether it may be maintained as a class action.
Indeed, such a procedure contravenes the Rule by allowing a
representative plaintiff to secure the benefits of a class action without
253
first satisfying the requirements for it.

Notwithstanding Eisen’s disallowing the aggregation determination to
rise or fall on a case’s merits, a court may inquire into merits that overlap
with certification criteria.254 The seminal case that confirmed this in the
civil rights context is Wal-Mart v. Dukes.255
In Wal-Mart, plaintiffs’ allegations of a pattern or practice of Title VII
employment discrimination were interlaced with Rule 23’s requirement
that the case involve common questions of law or fact.256 Like its
predecessors, Wal-Mart reiterated the necessity for rigor and the movant’s
burden of proof at the class certification stage.257
But unlike prior case law, Wal-Mart conditioned its finding of
“commonality” on plaintiffs’ having to put forth “‘[s]ignificant proof’ that
ascertainability.
251. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 351–52 (2011); Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin,
417 U.S. 156, 177 (1974).
252. Eisen, 417 U.S. at 177.
253. Id.
254. Gen. Tel. Co. of the Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 160–61 (1982).
255. 564 U.S. 338 (2011).
256. Id. at 344–45. In the interest of full disclosure, the author briefly represented the plaintiffs
in the Wal-Mart case approximately fifteen years ago.
257. Id. at 352–53.
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[the employer] ‘operated under a general policy of discrimination.’”258
Arguably the easiest of Rule 23’s gatekeeper provisions, commonality
became the blockade for 1.5 million women’s259 attempt to collectively
challenge their employer for alleged nationwide gender discrimination.260
To prevail in a pattern or practice case on the merits, plaintiffs must
ultimately prove, inter alia, that a discriminatory policy (formal or
informal) exists.261 Plaintiffs seeking class certification must now put
forth “significant proof” that that predicate has been met, just to bond as a
class.262 Thus, the criteria for commonality not only overlaps with the
merits, but aligns more closely with plaintiffs’ likelihood of prevailing on
the merits in a systemic discrimination claim. In other words, worthiness
becomes a screening device for collective access to the court in systemic
discrimination cases. This proves problematic where a court may rely on
its own prejudgments and worldview when determining whether there is
sufficient proof of a discriminatory policy’s existence.263
This foreshadowing function is precisely what Eisen rejected.264 Class
certification is not the juncture at which a judge should speculate about a
case’s viability.265 Neither is it the vehicle through which a judge should
impede a later determination on the merits. Class certification and merits
are like overlapping tectonic plates; a slight shift can have a major effect
on the civil litigation landscape.
Applying this higher commonality burden of proof, Wal-Mart
decertified the case on the grounds that there was “not enough glue” to
hold the case together as a class action.266 Not unlike the desegregation
cases of the 1960’s—where school boards manufactured individualized
258. Id. at 353 (quoting Gen. Tel. Co. of the Sw., 457 U.S. at 159 n.15).
259. Id. at 342.
260. Id. at 357.
261. See id. at 352–55.
262. Id. at 353 (emphasis added).
263. See A. Benjamin Spencer, Class Actions, Heightened Commonality, and Declining Access
to Justice, 93 B.U.L. REV. 441, 445 (2013) (describing how Wal-Mart’s heightened commonality
standard stemmed in part from “[c]laimant animus, combined with hostility toward and a
misunderstanding of claims of discrimination”); see also Malveaux, A Diamond in the Rough, supra
note 98, at 492–99 (describing the Wal-Mart majority’s incredulity that a majority of male mangers
could exercise their discretion in a way that disadvantages female employees).
264. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 177 (1974).
265. Two years after Wal-Mart, the Court’s rhetoric swung back to a more cabined approach.
Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Tr. Funds, 586 U.S. 455, 465–66 (2013) (citing Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 350–51 (2011)) (“Rule 23 grants courts no license to engage in freeranging merits inquiries at the certification stage. Merits questions may be considered to the extent—
but only to the extent—that they are relevant to determining whether the Rule 23 prerequisites for
class certification are satisfied.”).
266. Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 352.
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pupil assignment factors like geography, bus transportation routes, age,
and student aptitude to deflect a court away from the real determinant
“race”—Wal-Mart did the same regarding gender in the employment
context.267 Highlighting the fact that pay and promotion decisions were
made by different supervisors, in different stores, at different times, for
different jobs, etc.—the employer was able to deflect attention away from
the real and systemic determinant “gender.”
How has Wal-Mart’s heightened commonality impacted other civil
rights cases? What ripple effect has resulted and what are the implications
of even this small wave? For every action, there is an equal and opposite
reaction. This has certainly been the case regarding the pragmatic
response to Wal-Mart’s heightened commonality standard. A half-dozen
years post-Wal-Mart, litigants and judges have shaped the parameters of
the case’s reach. It has certainly become more difficult for litigants to
challenge highly discretionary discriminatory conduct on a class-wide
basis post-Wal-Mart.268 However, recognizing the Court’s reticence to
certify a class of over 1.5 million class members nationwide, other litigants
have sought certification of cases of far less enormity and breadth.269
Putative classes are now more narrowly defined, geographically limited,
and divided into subclasses.270 Plaintiffs have turned to state courts as a
potentially more receptive venue for granting class certification.271
An excellent example of recalibration post-Wal-Mart is the robust
development of jurisprudence regarding issue certification.272 When
267. This isn’t to suggest that Wal-Mart and the school board cases are on the same scale or aren’t
distinct in significant ways.
268. Tabor v. Hilti, Inc., 703 F.3d 1206, 1229 (10th Cir. 2013) (“After Wal-Mart, federal courts
reviewing class certification questions have generally denied certification when allegedly
discriminatory policies are highly discretionary and the plaintiffs do not point to ‘a common mode of
exercising discretion that pervades the entire company.’” (quoting In re Wells Fargo Residential
Mortg. Lending Discrimination Litig., No. 08-MD-01930 MMC, 2011 WL 3903117, at *4–5 (N.D.
Cal. Sept. 6, 2011))).
269. See SEYFARTH SHAW LLP, ANNUAL WORKPLACE CLASS ACTION LITIGATION REPORT:
2014 EDITION 2–6 (2014), http://www.workplaceclassaction.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/214/
2014/01/CAR-2014.pdf.
270. See Michael Selmi & Sylvia Tsakos, Employment Discrimination Class Actions After WalMart v. Dukes, 48 AKRON L. REV. 803, 829–30 (2015); see, e.g., Anne Bucher, New Wal-Mart Gender
Discrimination Class Action Lawsuit Filed, TOP CLASS ACTIONS (Nov. 10, 2017),
https://topclassactions.com/lawsuit-settlements/lawsuit-news/825782-new-walmart-genderdiscrimination-class-action-lawsuit-filed/,.
271. Malveaux, A Diamond in the Rough, supra note 98, at 499, 499 n.268 (citing Kumar v. Gate
Gourmet, Inc., 325 P.3d 193 (Wash. 2014)).
272. See Challenging Limited Issue Class Actions, FOLEY & LARDNER LLP (Apr. 27, 2017),
https://www.foley.com/challenging-limited-issue-class-actions-04-27-2017/ (discussing “growing
trend” of relying on issue classes and changes in “tactics and strategies employed by all parties” postWal-Mart).
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possible, litigants are seeking to certify a particular issue273 rather than an
entire claim, 274 and some courts are granting this tapered request. As civil
rights claimants move from Rule 23(b)(2) to (b)(3), discussed supra, they
must meet the latter’s strictures of proving that common issues
predominate over individual ones for class certification.275 Litigants,
however, are also able per Rule 23(c)(4) to seek certification of a single
issue where appropriate. Thus, specific issues related to liability have been
cordoned off and subjected to class treatment, over objections that this
undermines Rule 23(b)(3)’s requirement that common questions
predominate over individual ones.
Courts and commentators are divided276 over whether a judge must
consider a plaintiff’s entire claim when determining whether common
issues predominate over individual ones under (b)(3), and then apply (c)(4)
to certify a particular issue; or whether a judge may extract a particular
issue per (c)(4), and then consider predominance per (b)(3). The Second,
Third, Fourth, Seventh and Ninth Circuits have supported the latter
approach, albeit using different methods.277 The Fifth Circuit has taken

273. Rule 23(c)(4) states: “When appropriate, an action may be maintained as a class action with
respect to particular issues.” FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(4).
274. See SEYFARTH SHAW LLP, 13TH ANNUAL WORKPLACE CLASS ACTION LITIGATION
REPORT: 2017 EDITION 26 (2017) [hereinafter SEYFARTH SHAW LLP, 2017 REPORT],
http://www.workplaceclassaction.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/214/2017/01/CAR-2017-Chapter-1FINAL.pdf (“In terms of certification theories, the plaintiffs’ bar is apt to pursue hybrid or parallel
class certification theories where injunctive relief is sought under Rule 23(b)(2) and monetary relief is
sought under Rule 23(b)(3), as well as a range of partial ‘issues certification’ theories under Rule
23(c)(4).”).
275. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).
276. Compare John C. Coffee, The New Class Action Landscape: A Trail Map to Class
Certification and Practice after Wal-Mart and Concepcion, in THE 15TH ANNUAL NATIONAL
INSTITUTE ON CLASS ACTIONS A1, A-102 (A.B.A. 2011), with Mark A. Perry, Issue Certification
Under Rule 23(c)(4): A Reappraisal, 62 DEPAUL L. REV. 733, 733–34 (2013).
277. See In re Nassau County Strip Search Cases, 461 F.3d 219, 226–27 (2d Cir. 2006) (approving
of issue certification); McLaughlin v. Am. Tobacco Co., 522 F.3d 215, 234 (2d Cir. 2008) (issue
certification approved when it would “reduce the range of issues in dispute and promote judicial
economy”); Gates v. Rohm & Haas Co., 655 F.3d 255, 272 (3d Cir. 2011) (adopting approach from
PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 2.02 (AM. LAW. INST. 2010)); McReynolds v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 672 F.3d 482, 491 (7th Cir. 2012) (approving issue
certification in cases where there are “genuinely common issues, issues identical across all the
claimants . . . the accuracy of the resolution of which is unlikely to be enhanced by repeated
proceedings” (quoting Mejdrech v. Met-Coil Systems Corp., 319 F.3d 910, 911 (7th Cir. 2003));
Valentino v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., 97 F.3d 1227, 1234 (9th Cir. 1996) (“Even if the common questions
do not predominate over the individual questions so that class certification of the entire action is
warranted, Rule 23 authorizes the district court in appropriate cases to isolate the common issues under
Rule 23(c)(4)(A) and proceed with class treatment of these particular issues.”). The Rule 23
Subcommittee to the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules recently considered amendments to Rule 23
that would make issue certification easier.
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the former approach,278 but retreated somewhat,279 leading some to
conclude that there is more consensus on the matter.280
Given the judicial economy and efficiency that aggregate litigation
offers, it’s no wonder that many federal court judges are trending toward
permitting some limited aggregation in the (b)(3) context. To the extent
that systemic discrimination cases are housed here, issue certification
should remain.
Moreover, issue certification should be available for Rule 23(b)(2)
classes.281 Injunctive civil rights cases often have discrete issues—such as
the existence and impact of a particular policy—that warrant certification
on efficacy grounds.282
In addition to constricting the edges of the litigation form, litigants and
judges have conceptually cabined Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes by
distinguishing it from similar cases. In Wal-Mart, plaintiffs contended that
the employer gave its local managers unfettered discretion when making
salary and promotion decisions, to the detriment of its female
employees.283 Plaintiffs alleged that this excessive subjectivity was the
vehicle for nationwide gender discrimination by a workforce managed
largely by men in a culture that promoted unchecked gender
stereotyping.284 In this environment, male supervisors at stores all over
the country allegedly exercised their discretion in a discriminatory
278. See Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 745 n.21 (5th Cir. 1996) (“A district court
cannot manufacture predominance through the nimble use of subdivision (c)(4).”).
279. See In re Deepwater Horizon, 739 F.3d 790, 806 & n.66, 816–17 & n.122 (5th Cir. 2014)
(agreeing with Sixth, Seventh and Ninth Circuits in concluding that district court did not abuse its
discretion in certifying Rule 23(b)(3) class where liability and damages determinations were bifurcated
under Rule 23(c)(4) and district court reserved damages issues for individual determinations).
280. For example, the Rule 23 Subcommittee to the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules decided
to forego amending Rule 23 to address issue certification because of this evolving consensus. Notes
of September 11, 2015 Subcommittee Meeting, in ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES AGENDA
BOOK FOR NOVEMBER 2015 151, 151 (2015), http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/2015-11civil-agenda_book.pdf. In contrast to the majority of circuits and the rulemakers, Congress is
advocating for the stricter issue certification approach. The measure passed the House of
Representatives on March 9, 2017, but has since stymied. See H.R. 985, 115th Cong. § 1720 (2017);
Class Action Issues Update November 2017, AM. ANTITRUST INST. (Nov. 6, 2017),
http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/content/class-action-issues-update-november-2017.
281. See Letter from Jocelyn D. Larkin, Exec. Dir., Impact Fund, to Comm. on Rules of Practice
and Procedure 4 (Sept. 4, 2015) [hereinafter Larkin Letter], http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/
default/files/2017-01-04-testimony_and_comment_handout.pdf.
282. See id.; Letter from Leslie A. Brueckner, Senior Att’y Public Justice, to Rule 23 Subcomm.
of the Judicial Conference Advisory Comm. on Civil Rules 6 (Sept. 8, 2015),
http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/2017-01-04-testimony_and_comment_handout.pdf
(criticizing approach that would amend Rule 23 to deal with issue certification in (b)(3) context, while
improperly precluding issue certification in (b)(2) cases).
283. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 344–45 (2011).
284. See id.
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manner, although perhaps subconsciously, while the company’s
leadership intentionally looked away.285 Plaintiffs offered workforce
statistics, individual affidavits and social science data as significant proof
that the employer operated under a general policy of discrimination—i.e.,
imbuing local supervisors with excessive discretion when making
personnel decisions that adversely affected women’s employment
opportunities.286 Plaintiffs alleged, effectively, that it was the wild, wild,
west.
But for the Court, the company’s lack of a policy being the
discriminatory policy was a bridge too far.287 This was especially true
where the company also had, at least on paper, a formal, written antidiscrimination policy.288 Where such a written policy existed, the Court
was incredulous that a majority of supervisors would exercise their
discretion in a way that harms the employment opportunities of women.289
Given the recent onslaught of sexual harassment employment
discrimination claims industry-wide in Hollywood and elsewhere, this
incredulity seems even less justified.
The Court inexplicably paid undue homage to a relatively standard
corporate practice—i.e., a company providing boilerplate language that
formally forbids discrimination—in the Court’s assessment of whether
there was significant proof of a discriminatory policy. Certainly,
subjective decision-making that permits implicit bias to go unchecked may
co-exist with a formal discrimination prohibition.
In any event, not surprisingly, in other cases where putative class
members allege the same type of policy of excessive subjectivity as a
vehicle for discrimination as in Wal-Mart, they have suffered a similar
fate.290 Their cases have not been certified—inside and outside the Title
VII context.
285. Id.
286. Id. at 346.
287. Id. at 355–56.
288. Id. at 353.
289. Id. at 353–55.
290. See Davis v. Cintas Corp., 717 F.3d 476, 487–89 (6th Cir. 2013) (relying on Wal-Mart, and
concluding that commonality was not satisfied in case brought by women alleging gender
discrimination under Title VII because plaintiff “could not show that a number of women, who failed
to obtain employment at many places, over a long time, under a largely subjective hiring system,
shared a common question of law or fact”); Tabor v. Hilti, Inc., 703 F.3d 1206, 1228–29 (10th Cir.
2013) (relying on Wal-Mart, affirming denial of class certification and finding lack of commonality
in Title VII gender discrimination case because of “broad discretion involved in Hilti’s alleged
discriminatory employment practice and the highly individualized facts and circumstances raised in
each employment decision”); Bolden v. Walsh Constr. Co., 688 F.3d 893, 896–99 (7th Cir. 2012)
(relying on Wal-Mart, distinguishing McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 672
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Other courts, however, have distinguished Wal-Mart, despite the fact
that the litigants identified discretionary practices as potentially harmful
to group rights. For example, in McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc., the Seventh Circuit (Judge Posner) overturned the
denial of class certification where local branch and regional managers
exercised their discretion pursuant to explicit companywide national
teaming and account distribution policies.291 Alternatively, in Scott v.
Family Dollar Stores, the Fourth Circuit vacated and remanded the denial
of class certification where the upper-level managers of the company
themselves exercised the challenged discretion.292 In these cases,
commonality was satisfied despite plaintiffs’ allegations that discretionary
practices were discriminatory and far-reaching.
The distinction between these cases and Wal-Mart can be explained
by how close the nexus is between the allegedly discriminatory decisionmakers and corporate policy. In McReynolds, although those who made
the adverse discretionary decisions were local, low-level managers, their
actions were tightly connected to centralized, nationwide policies created
at the corporate level.293 In Scott, those who made the adverse
discretionary decisions were high-level managers, who exercised such
centralized power and control that their actions were equivalent to
corporate policy.294
In Wal-Mart, the employer deliberately chose to decentralize power295
and to widely disburse it among its supervisory personnel who were
allegedly left unchecked and prone to potential bias (implicit or explicit)
in making personnel decisions.296 Conceptually, there seems little
F.3d 482 (7th Cir. 2012), reversing class certification, and finding lack of commonality in case brought
by African-American construction workers alleging race discrimination under Title VII because “local
discretion cannot support a company-wide class no matter how cleverly lawyers may try to repackage
local variability as uniformity”); Bennett v. Nucor Corp., 656 F.3d 802, 815–16 (8th Cir. 2011)
(relying on Wal-Mart, and concluding that commonality was not satisfied in case brought by AfricanAmerican employees alleging race discrimination under Title VII because they did not “demonstrate
that the employer had a policy of allowing discretion by lower-level supervisors over employment
matters” and “that all supervisors ‘exercise[d] their discretion in a common way”); see also Ellis v.
Costco Wholesale Corp., 657 F.3d 970, 980–85, 988 (9th Cir. 2011) (relying on Wal-Mart, vacating
and remanding the lower court’s decision to certify a class of current and former employees for failure
to meet the commonality and typicality standards).
291. McReynolds, 672 F.3d at 489, 492.
292. Scott v. Family Dollar Stores, Inc., 733 F.3d 105, 114, 119 (4th Cir. 2013).
293. McReynolds, 672 F.3d at 490.
294. Scott, 733 F.3d at 114.
295. For purposes of this article, the author does not weigh in on whether the record supports this
conclusion. Taking as true, arguendo, the Court’s conclusion that power was decentralized at WalMart, this was a policy choice the corporation made that does not warrant different certification
treatment.
296. This, of course, is contextual. Whether personnel are prone to bias may be, in part,
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justification for treating one employer’s policy choice differently than
another, for purposes of class certification.
Granted, supervisors in the field untethered from corporate oversight
could lead to rogue actors and behaviors. This would certainly be relevant
to whether there was a pattern or practice of discrimination. But equally
relevant would be whether a company intentionally crafted a personnel
scheme with minimal corporate participation and oversight, and
knowingly turned a blind eye to the consequential discriminatory practices
of its subordinates. Also relevant is the extent to which such employment
decisions operated in an environment that allegedly institutionalized
gender inequality and power inequities.
While Wal-Mart has not sounded the death knell for employment
discrimination and civil rights class actions—including those alleging
discretionary behavior—the ruling has front-loaded and elevated the
merits inquiry at the class certification stage. The expense and time
involved in merits discovery for all parties at the class certification stage
warrant concern. The hidden cost of front-loading such discovery may
deter potentially meritorious cases from being brought. Indeed, fewer
employment discrimination class actions, for example, have already been
filed post-Wal-Mart.297
2. Contractual Rights Over Civil Rights: The Enforcement of Class
Arbitration Bans
Given the seminal role of aggregate litigation in eradicating systemic
discrimination, one of the most troubling trends of modern civil litigation
is the privatization of the justice system.298 This is because for dispute
resolution systems outside of the public domain—such as pre-dispute
compulsory arbitration—there are often less procedural protections for
workers, consumers and every-day litigants.299 Examples of such waived
protections include the right to a jury trial, subsidized forum, transparent
process, written record, robust discovery, binding legal precedent and
significant appellate review.300 Remedies may be proscribed, precedent

environmentally based. In Wal-Mart, plaintiffs argued that the risk of bias was significant because of
the corporate culture. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 345 (2011).
297. See Selmi & Tsakos, supra note 270, at 804, 804 n.5.
298. See generally Suzette M. Malveaux, Is It the “Real Thing”? How Coke’s One-Way Binding
Arbitration May Bridge the Divide Between Litigation and Arbitration, 2009 J. DISP. RESOL. 77 (2009)
[hereinafter Malveaux, Is It the Real Thing?].
299. Id. at 80–81, 83–85.
300. Id. at 84.
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jettisoned and arbitrators’ neutrality compromised.301
Having said that, arbitration may offer advantages that the court
system does not. It may include lower costs, greater speed, more
flexibility in process and remedy, enhanced privacy and a decision-maker
with superior subject-matter expertise.302
Given the considerable distinctions between private arbitration and the
public litigation system, one would expect the presence of significant
safeguards to ensure that parties knowingly consent to one forum over
another. To the contrary, many individuals with little or no bargaining
power are compelled to forego their “day in court” because they
unknowingly signed an arbitration clause appearing in fine print, buried in
a contract, written in incomprehensible legalese.303 The bulwarks of
freedom of contract—such as a meeting of the minds and consent—
quickly break down in this environment, thereby undermining familiar
justifications for the enforcement of such arbitration agreements.
Over the last several decades,304 and more acutely under the Roberts
Court, the Supreme Court has trended toward enforcement of private
arbitration agreements.305 This deference has resulted in a proliferation of
arbitration agreements in all manner of contract, including employment.306
Emboldened by this jurisprudence, by 2007, employers had contracted
with twenty percent of the workforce to waive court access for workplace
disputes.307 A recent study indicates that “since the early 2000s, the share
of workers subject to mandatory arbitration has more than doubled and
now exceeds 55 percent.”308
301. Id. at 84–85.
302. Id. at 84. However, there are occasions when arbitration is more expensive than litigation
given the hourly cost of an arbitrator and various fees.
303. Id. at 85.
304. See id. at 80–83 (describing prevalence and evolution of pre-dispute compulsory arbitration
agreements).
305. The latest example of this is Kindred Nursing Centers Limited Partnership v. Clark, in
which the United States Supreme Court held that FAA was violated where state rule held that
arbitration agreement was unenforceable because waiver of court access and jury trial was conditioned
upon express provision in power-of-attorney. 137 S. Ct. 1421, 1425 (2017).
306. See Malveaux, Is It the Real Thing?, supra note 298, at 83.
307. A 2007 study found that approximately one out of five employees are subject to arbitration.
Alexander J.S. Colvin, Empirical Research on Employment Arbitration: Clarity Amidst the Sound and
Fury?, 11 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 405, 411 (2007) (“Although there are limitations to the existing
studies, they do show a consistent pattern of significant expansion of employment . . . a current
estimate in the range of 15 to 25 percent of employers having adopted employment arbitration seems
reasonable.”).
308. ALEXANDER J.S. COLVIN, THE GROWING USE OF MANDATORY ARBITRATION; ACCESS TO
THE COURT IS NOW BARRED FOR MORE THAN 60 MILLION AMERICAN WORKERS, ECON. POL’Y INST.
1 (2017), http://www.epi.org/files/pdf/135056.pdf. The study also found that more than half of
nonunion private-sector employers have mandatory arbitration. Id. at 1–2. This number goes over
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Not only is significant employment in the United States conditioned
on waiver of court access, employment is increasingly conditioned on
waiver of collective action. Fueled by favorable jurisprudence, a growing
number of businesses are inserting class action bans in arbitration
agreements embedded in their employment contracts.309 For example,
from 2012 to 2015, class arbitration bans increased from 16.1% to
39.2%.310 A recent study found that, of employees subjected to mandatory
arbitration, over 41% have signed a class action waiver.311 This results in
over 23% of private-sector nonunion employees—24.7 million American
workers—not permitted to bring a class action for employment claims.312
Consequently, employees seeking to challenge discriminatory personnel
practices through negative value suits are foreclosed from doing so outside
the class action paradigm.
The Court’s key rulings have enabled this trend.313 For example, in
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, the Court upheld the enforceability of
a class arbitration ban despite California’s judicial rule that certain bans
were unconscionable.314 The Court concluded that California’s law was
inconsistent with the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) and pre-empted by
the Act.315 California could not condition the enforceability of an
arbitration agreement on the availability of a class action.316 Concepcion
established this prohibition despite the American Arbitration
Association’s history of successful class arbitrations, the admitted
importance of aggregation to small dollar claims, and the application of
California’s class action ban to arbitration and litigation alike.317
Similarly, in American Express v. Italian Colors Restaurant, the Court
upheld an arbitration agreement that foreclosed aggregation but went even
65% for companies larger than 1,000 employees. Id. For private-sector non-union employees, over
56% are subject to mandatory arbitration. Id. at 2. Consequently, the study concludes that for the
overall workforce, over 60 million American workers are subject to arbitration. Id. at 5.
309. See id. at 1–2.
310. Julianna Thomas McCabe, SCOTUS to Determine Enforceability of Class Action Waivers in
Employment Contract Arbitration Clauses, CLASSIFIED: THE CLASS ACTION BLOG (Jan. 13, 2017),
http://classifiedclassaction.com/scotus-determine-enforceability-class-action-waivers-employ
ment-contract-arbitration-clauses/.
311. Colvin, supra note 307, at 2.
312. Id.
313. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2313 (2013) (Kagan, J.,
dissenting).
314. 563 U.S. 333, 351–52 (2011).
315. Id. at 352.
316. Id. at 344.
317. The Supreme Court again held that California law was pre-empted by the FAA because the
state court allegedly interpreted arbitration agreements with class actions bans less favorably than
other contracts. See DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. 463, 471 (2015).
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farther.318 In this antitrust case, the Court concluded that even if a
proposed class of merchant plaintiffs proves that it is economically
impossible to individually pursue their cases in arbitration, an arbitration
agreement that forbids them from seeking a class action is enforceable
under the FAA.319 Pursuant to the agreement’s terms, a party is compelled
to pursue its claim individually—regardless of whether individual
arbitration is impossible or irrational to pursue.320 In this case, the cost of
an expert analysis necessary to prove the merchants’ claims far exceeded
each individual’s potential recovery (some by ten times).321 Thus, in the
absence of any cost-sharing with the defendant, aggregation was the only
viable way to challenge defendant’s business practices.322
The Court has articulated a commitment to arbitration subject to the
forum’s being an effective vehicle for rights vindication.323 The effective
vindication rule, however, has been significantly eroded by American
Express. The Court’s prioritization of the existence of rights in theory
over practice324 allows arbitration to be used as a shield for corporate
malfeasance and accountability. This misappropriation delegitimizes the
significant value of this litigation alternative and unfortunately risks
equating the forum with abusive practices and partiality.
The Court has the opportunity to rein in this misappropriation in Epic
Systems Corp. v. Lewis.325 The Court recently granted review to determine
whether an arbitration agreement between an employer and employee that
waives Rule 23 class actions and FLSA collective proceedings for laborrelated claims is enforceable under the Federal Arbitration Act,
notwithstanding the National Labor Relations Act’s protection of an
employee’s right to engage in “concerted activities.”
In this case, employee Jacob Lewis sued his employer, Epic Systems
Corp., in federal court on behalf of himself and other technical writers,
alleging that Epic violated the FLSA and Wisconsin law by misclassifying
318. See Italian Colors, 133 S. Ct. at 2309.
319. Id.
320. See id.
321. Id. at 2308.
322. See id.
323. The Court has stated on numerous occasions that arbitration is permissible “so long as the
prospective litigant effectively may vindicate its statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum . . . .”
Id. at 2310 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 637
(1985)).
324. Id. at 2309.
325. See Lewis v. Epic Sys. Corp., 823 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 2016), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 809
(2017). The Supreme Court recently heard arguments in the case. Amy Howe, Argument Analysis:
An Epic Day for Employers in Arbitration Case?, SCOTUSblog (Oct. 2, 2017, 2:50 PM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/10/argument-analysis-epic-day-employers-arbitration-case/.
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them and unlawfully denying them overtime pay. 326 Epic moved to
dismiss the complaint and compel individual arbitration pursuant to an
arbitration agreement prohibiting class and collective actions in the
adhesion employment contract.
The courts below concluded that the class arbitration waiver violated
the NLRA’s Section 7, which gives employees the right to “engage in . . .
concerted activities for the purpose of . . . mutual aid or protection,” and
Section 8, which enables them to enforce that right.327 Moreover, the
Seventh Circuit held the arbitration agreement unenforceable under the
Federal Arbitration Act’s “savings clause” because the agreement violated
“generally applicable contract defenses.”328 More specifically, the
arbitration agreement is allegedly unenforceable under the FAA because
it violates the NLRA.329
The propriety of class action bans in employment arbitration
agreements has come to a head, with the circuit courts split on the issue.330
This is the question the Supreme Court seeks to resolve.
At risk is that arbitration agreements will effectively become
exculpatory clauses. Workers will be compelled to forgo their rights in
exchange for employment through boilerplate adhesion contracts that
disallow class arbitration and make individual arbitration cost-prohibitive.
Thus, workers who have discrimination and fair wage claims that arise in
the course of their employment may not be able to effectively challenge
systemic misconduct, especially where their claims and wages are small.
This capture of the arbitral forum does harm to the procedural vehicle itself
and does a disservice to those individuals seeking to use the civil rights
provision of the modern class action rule as intended.331 The outcome will
be less enforcement in the cases where it is needed the most. And given
the likelihood that the enforcement gap cannot be effectively filled by
relevant government agencies, the rule of law is endangered.

326. See id. at 1151.
327. Id. at 1155 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012)).
328. Id. at 1156 (an arbitration agreement “shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon
such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract” (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2
(2012))).
329. Id. at 1156–57.
330. The Seventh and Ninth Circuits have concluded that such class action waivers are
unenforceable because of their interference with the NLRA. See e.g., id.; NLRB v. Stone, 125 F.2d
752, 756 (7th Cir. 1942); Morris v. Ernst & Young LLP, 834 F.3d 975, 990 (9th Cir. 2016), cert.
granted, 137 S. Ct. 809 (2017). The Second, Fifth, and Eighth Circuits disagree. Cellular Sales of
Missouri, LLC v. N.L.R.B., 824 F.3d 772, 776 (8th Cir. 2016); Murphy Oil USA, Inc. v. N.L.R.B.,
808 F.3d 1013, 1015 (5th Cir. 2015); Sutherland v. Ernst & Young LLP, 726 F.3d 290, 297 n.8 (2d
Cir. 2013).
331. See Marcus, History of the Modern Class Action, supra note 28, at 608.
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3. Statutory, Constitutional and Evidentiary Gateway Issues to
Collective Litigation
The recent direction of aggregation jurisprudence has proven more
nuanced as parties on both sides jockey to define how wide the door should
be for access to representative litigation. The parameters of the federal
procedural rules, the Constitution, and evidentiary proof are the latest
battleground upon which plaintiffs and defendants vie for influence. The
Court’s response has been mixed.
a. Gamesmanship
Two recent opinions by former Civil Procedure Professor, now
Supreme Court Justice, Ginsburg illustrate the Court’s intolerance for
perceived gamesmanship on both sides. On the one hand, the Court has
rejected defendants’ manufacturing mootness of putative class actions by
paying off named plaintiffs’ individual claims. On the other hand, the
Court has rejected plaintiffs’ circumventing the discretionary interlocutory
appellate process for certification denials by voluntarily dismissing their
individual cases. The Court’s rulings have identified the envelope’s edge
as both the defense and plaintiffs’ bar attempt strategies that promote the
interests of their client base.
Plaintiffs may take some solace in the Court’s treatment of defendants’
offers of judgment and settlement made to named plaintiffs to moot
putative class actions. The impact of such offers on the viability of
potential aggregation has evolved in plaintiffs’ favor.
Initially, in Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk, the Court held that
a collective action under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) became
moot when, before moving for conditional class certification and before
any plaintiffs opted-in, the named plaintiff received an offer of judgment
under Rule 68 that would fully resolve all of her claims.332 Where the sole
named plaintiff received an offer—which was unaccepted—that mooted
her FLSA claim, the collective action was also mooted.333 Thus, an
employer at risk of significant class-wide liability could strategically avoid
such potential exposure by offering the individual class representative
complete relief upfront.
However, in Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, the Court later
332. 569 U.S. 66, 69–71, 78–79 (2013).
333. See id. at 78. The Supreme Court did not decide whether a Rule 68 offer of judgment could
moot an individual case, but rather presumed this. Id.
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disallowed a company to defeat class certification by making a complete
Rule 68 offer of judgment or settlement offer—which was unaccepted—
to the individual putative class representative.334 Gomez adopted the
rationale of Justice Kagan’s dissent in Symczyk, noting that as most firstyear law students are taught, an unaccepted offer has no legal
consequence.335 This plaintiff victory, however, may be tempered by what
the Court did not decide: “We need not, and do not, now decide whether
the result would be different if a defendant deposits the full amount of the
plaintiff’s individual claim in an account payable to the plaintiff, and the
court then enters judgment for the plaintiff in that amount.”336
This open question foreshadows mootness issues to come, as
evidenced already in the courts below.337 At this juncture, however, those
seeking to challenge systemic discrimination under the refuge of the
modern class action rule need not fear that this defense tactic will diminish
the scope of their case.
Alternatively, defendants may take some solace in the Court’s
treatment of plaintiffs’ use of voluntary dismissals to immediately
challenge certification denials. In Microsoft Corp. v. Baker, owners of
Microsoft’s Xbox 360 videogame console filed a putative class action
alleging a design defect.338 The district court struck plaintiffs’ class
allegations from the complaint, resulting in plaintiffs’ seeking the Ninth
Circuit’s permission to immediately appeal the certification denial
pursuant to Rule 23(f).339 When the appellate court exercised its discretion
in plaintiffs’ disfavor, they voluntarily dismissed their individual claims
with prejudice, but reserved the right to resurrect them if the appellate
court reversed the lower court’s certification denial.340
Armed with what they thought was a final decision, the plaintiffs
appealed only the Ninth Circuit’s decision to strike their class
allegations.341 The Ninth Circuit concluded that it had jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1291—which empowers the appellate court to review only
“final decisions of the district courts”—and reversed the lower court’s

334. 136 S. Ct. 663, 666–68, 671–72 (2016).
335. Id. at 670; Symczyk, 569 U.S. at 81 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“As every first-year law student
learns, the recipient’s rejection of an offer ‘leaves the matter as if no offer had ever been made.’”).
336. Gomez, 136 S. Ct. at 672.
337. See, e.g., Chen v. Allstate Ins., 819 F.3d 1136, 1144–45 (9th Cir. 2016) (holding that
defendant’s deposit did not moot plaintiff’s individual claim).
338. 137 S. Ct. 1702, 1710 (2017).
339. Id. at 1710–11.
340. Id. at 1711.
341. Id. at 1711–12.

2017

THE MODERN CLASS ACTION RULE

381

decision to strike the class claims.342
Upon Microsoft’s challenge to the appellate court’s jurisdiction, the
Supreme Court held that the Ninth Circuit lacked § 1291 jurisdiction
because plaintiffs’ voluntary-dismissal decision was not a final decision,
but rather a tactic to circumvent Rule 23(f)’s discretionary interlocutory
review of certification denials.343 The Court rejected this tactic not only
because it appeared to be a work-around discretionary review—and thus a
rebuke of the courts’ roles in relation to each other and the rulemaking
process344—but that it also unfairly favored plaintiffs over defendants.345
As in Gomez, Justice Ginsburg rejected what she perceived as “one-sided”
gamesmanship too close to the line. Consequently, those defending
themselves from allegations of class-wide discrimination need not fear
that certification denials can be immediately appealed solely at the
plaintiffs’ discretion.346 In sum, for plaintiffs and defendants alike, the
current Court is not only in the business of safeguarding legal boundaries,
but also of policing aggregate litigation strategies when they flout more
prudential lines.
b. Standing
Another issue for those seeking to redress systemic discrimination via
aggregation is the extent to which the Court may cabin or broaden the
standing doctrine for named plaintiffs and putative class members.
Standing has increasingly become a gateway issue for class actions, with
both plaintiff and defense counsel poised to do battle and declare
victory.347
On the defense side, litigants contend that there has been a
proliferation of class actions filed by named plaintiffs who are uninjured
342. Id.
343. Id. at 1715; see id. at 1712 (“Because respondents’ dismissal device subverts the finaljudgment rule and the process Congress has established for refining that rule and for determining when
nonfinal orders may be immediately appealed . . . the tactic does not give rise to a ‘final decisio[n]’
under § 1291.”).
344. Id. at 1714–15.
345. Id. at 1715. The Court referred to the voluntary-dismissal device as “one-sided” and noted
that “[r]espondents’ theory permits plaintiffs only, never defendants, to force an immediate appeal of
an adverse certification ruling.” Id. Moreover, the voluntary-dismissal device works against “Rule
23(f)’s evenhanded prescription.” Id.
346. Id. at 1708, 1715.
347. See Perry Cooper, Both Sides Claim Victory in Statutory Injury SCOTUS Case, 84 U.S.L.W.
1688 (2016), https://www.bna.com/sides-claim-victory-n57982072511/ (“Both sides claimed victory
from the U.S. Supreme Court’s holding in a closely watched statutory violation suit May 16, that
plaintiffs must show concrete—but not necessarily tangible—injury to access the federal courts.”).
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and therefore ineligible to bring systemic statutory cases for want of
Article III standing. The argument goes that even where there is a
violation of the underlying statute, this is insufficient to confer standing if
there has not been a concomitant injury-in-fact. To allow otherwise would
give Congress the power to expand court jurisdiction beyond the
Constitution’s limitations. Moreover, the defense contends that a
proliferation of such class actions will unjustly enrich plaintiffs’ counsel
and clog the court system with frivolous litigation.348
On the plaintiff side, litigants argue against a heightened standing
requirement. They contend that when entities willfully violate someone’s
statutory rights, this should be sufficient to confer him standing.349 Where
Congress has created a private right of action to enforce a statutory
provision, it follows that a violation of that provision satisfies the injuryin-fact prerequisite. Otherwise, plaintiffs would not have access to the
courts to enforce a host of federal statutes, including anti-discrimination
ones.350
With the courts divided on this standing doctrine,351 the Supreme
Court has forayed into the area with mixed results. Its initial attempt in
First American Financial Corporation v. Edwards was lack luster,
resulting in the conclusion that the case had been improvidently granted.352
The Court’s more recent attempt, Spokeo Inc. v. Robins, while ultimately
remanding the question of standing to the lower court, has established a
more nuanced approach than either party embraced.353

348. Marcia Coyle, Justices Weigh Concrete Injuries in a Digital Age, SUPREME COURT BRIEF
(Nov. 2, 2015), https://www.law.com/supremecourtbrief/almID/1202741409084/.
349. A similar rationale justifies nominal damages for procedural violations that do not result in
actual injury. See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 248, 254–67 (1978) (holding that where there was
no proof of actual injury, students were only entitled to nominal damages for violation of Fourteenth
Amendment procedural due process in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 case).
350. Shari Claire Lewis, Standing to Assert Claims for Online Privacy Breaches; Internet
Issues/Social Media, N.Y.L.J. (Dec. 15, 2015), http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/id=120274457
5078/Standing-to-Assert-Claims-for-Online-Privacy-Breaches?slreturn=20170904223524;
Coyle,
supra note 348. The Ninth Circuit analogized the statutory rights created by the FCRA to those created
by civil rights statutes such as the Fair Housing Act (FHA), where a violation alone satisfies Article
III standing. See Robins v. Spokeo, Inc., 742 F.3d 409, 412 (9th Cir. 2014), vacated, 136 S. Ct. 1540
(2016) (finding “an individual’s personal interest in living in a racially integrated community” under
the FHA suffices for Article III standing).
351. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 9–12, Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016)
(No. 13-1339) (describing various court approaches over whether a statutory violation without a
concrete injury satisfies Article III standing, although not finding a split for FCRA claims); Reply
Brief for the Petitioner at 6–8, Spokeo, Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1540 (No. 13-1339) (describing lower court
conflict as “genuine and deepening”).
352. First Am. Fin. Corp. v. Edwards, 136 S. Ct. 1533 (2016).
353. Spokeo, Inc., 136 S. Ct. at 1550.
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In Spokeo Inc. v. Robins, the Court was tasked with determining in a
putative class action whether the named plaintiff Robins had Article III
standing to sue website operator Spokeo under the Fair Credit Reporting
Act (FCRA) for willfully publishing inaccurate information about him.354
Despite Robins’s contention that the false information impaired his ability
to get a job, the district court dismissed the case for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction.355 In particular, the district court held that Robins had alleged
only a statutory violation, and not an injury-in-fact, thus depriving him of
constitutional standing.356 The Ninth Circuit reversed, concluding that the
alleged statutory violation was sufficient for Article III standing.357
The Supreme Court—in a much-awaited opinion—ultimately did not
resolve the thorny question over the extent to which Congress has the
power to determine what constitutes an injury sufficient to confer Article
III standing. In a six-to-two opinion authored by Justice Alito,358 the Court
concluded that in order to have constitutional standing, Robins needed to
have suffered an “injury-in-fact,” which meant that the injury was both
“concrete and particularized.”359 The case was remanded because the
Ninth Circuit had failed to do this.360 The Court made clear, however, that
a “concrete” injury was not “necessarily synonymous with ‘tangible’” and
that “intangible injuries can nevertheless be concrete.”361 In fact, a “risk
of real harm” may satisfy “concreteness.” Congress has the power to
elevate an intangible harm to a concrete injury, but a “bare procedural
violation” is not enough to confer Article III standing.362 Although the
dissent concluded that Robins had already alleged an actual injury, the
majority did not—leaving this for the Ninth Circuit below.363
Spokeo permits named plaintiffs to collectively pursue claims under
federal statutes—including civil rights—when they suffer intangible
harms, so long as those harms are concrete. The fact that such harms are
sufficient to confer constitutional standing advantages plaintiffs.364 That
354. Id. at 1544.
355. Id.
356. Id.
357. Id. at 1544–45.
358. Justice Scalia unexpectedly passed away as the case was being considered.
359. Spokeo, Inc., 136 S. Ct. at 1545.
360. Id.
361. Id. at 1549
362. Id.
363. Id. at 1555–56 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see Robins v. Spokeo, Inc., 867 F.3d 1108, 1118
(9th Cir. 2017) (finding alleged injuries sufficiently concrete to establish Article III standing).
364. See, e.g., SEYFARTH SHAW LLP, 2017 REPORT, supra note 274, at 4 (“By opening the door
to more expanded standing principles, Spokeo is apt to subject employers to more litigation under
statutes likes the FCRA.”); Adrienne Pon, A Big Year for Class Actions in SCOTUS (2016 Term
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advantage is tempered, however, by whether plaintiffs will be able to
successfully prove that their claims go beyond mere technical statutory
violations.
Moreover, whether absent class members should each have to suffer
an injury-in-fact, thereby giving them standing, is hotly contested. There
is significant apprehension over the existence of “no-injury classes,”365 out
of concern, inter alia, that such classes are bloated with non-injured
individuals who will take from those with legitimate claims. This concern,
however, should not matter for the traditional (b)(2) civil rights injunctive
class action because of its focus on group harm and group remedy. There
is no individuation, thereby making an injury-in-fact prerequisite for each
absent class member purposeless.
This cannot be said for the (b)(3) class. Here, requiring standing to
encompass not only a federal statutory violation, but also actual injuries,
makes Rule 23(b)(3) class certification potentially less likely. Plaintiffs
run the risk that individualized injury-in-fact determinations will
predominate over the common question of a statutory violation, making
(b)(3) certification impossible.366 Erecting this certification barrier may
limit corporate exposure and deter plaintiffs from bringing aggregate
litigation in all manner of cases involving federal statutory rights.367 As
civil rights litigants pursuing monetary and injunctive relief post-WalMart are shunted from the traditional (b)(2) to (b)(3) class, the parameters
of the latter become more salient.
Although it is premature to predict the impact of Spokeo, on balance,
the Court’s standing doctrine is more nimble and nuanced than expected.
The contours of the standing doctrine are still very much being shaped,
giving lower courts the opportunity to craft jurisprudence consistent with
promoting court-access, law enforcement and Congressional restraint.
Similarly, Article III’s case or controversy requirement is potentially
another issue with far-reaching implications for the future of civil rights
aggregate litigation. This justiciability requirement may be an entry point
for courts’ tamping down the extent to which named plaintiffs may
represent class interests when their own individual claims have been
Review), IMPACT FUND (Aug. 18, 2016), https://www.impactfund.org/legal-practitionerblog/scotus16-classactions.
365. See, e.g., Kohen v. Pac. Inv. Mgmt. Co., 571 F.3d 672, 677 (7th Cir. 2009) (“[A] class should
not be certified if it is apparent that it contains a great many persons who have suffered no injury at
the hands of the defendant[.]” (citations omitted)).
366. See Cooper, supra note 347 (explaining that the question of whether a case may be certified
as a class action where its absent class members are uninjured was not decided by Tyson Foods Inc. v.
Bouaphakeo, 136 S. Ct. 1036 (2016), as anticipated.).
367. Lewis, supra note 350.
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extinguished.
The Court’s recent Microsoft decision is instructive. This instruction
comes in large part from what the Court did not decide. Tellingly, the
majority opinion of five justices368 skirted the second question that was
granted certiorari review: i.e., whether the federal appellate courts have
jurisdiction under Article III of the Constitution to review a class
certification denial after the named plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their
claims with prejudice.369 Relying on § 1291’s statutory jurisdictional
grounds, the majority never reached the constitutional standing question
squarely addressed by the concurrence.370
By contrast, Justice Thomas’ concurring opinion adopted the
judgment, but on constitutional grounds.371 More specifically, he
concluded that the named plaintiffs’ voluntary dismissal with prejudice
constituted a final judgment,372 but that the Ninth Circuit still lacked
jurisdiction because there was no “case” or “controversy” required by
Article III.373 Plaintiffs’ voluntary extinguishment of all of their individual
claims left them “no longer adverse” to Microsoft “on any claims.”374 The
concurrence narrowly defines the case-or-controversy justiciability
requirement in the class action context:
Class allegations, without an underlying individual claim, do not give
rise to a “case” or “controversy.” Those allegations are simply the means
of invoking a procedural mechanism that enables a plaintiff to litigate his
individual claims on behalf of a class. Thus, because the Court of
Appeals lacked Article III jurisdiction to adjudicate the individual
claims, it could not hear the plaintiffs’ appeal of the order striking their
375
class allegations.

This narrow justiciability interpretation—adopted by only three
Justices376—bodes unwell for putative classes. Decoupling individual
named plaintiffs from the putative class for case-or-controversy purposes
would neuter the latter whenever the former’s claims are resolved. This
368. Microsoft Corp. v. Baker, 137 S. Ct. 1702 (2017) (Justice Ginsburg authored the opinion,
which was joined by Justices Kennedy, Breyer, Sotomayor and Kagan).
369. Id. at 1712.
370. Id.
371. Id. at 1716 (Thomas, J., concurring). This was joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice
Alito. Id. at 1715 (Thomas, J., concurring).
372. Id. at 1716 (Thomas, J., concurring).
373. Id. at 1717 (Thomas, J., concurring).
374. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring).
375. Id. at 1718 (Thomas, J., concurring) (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
376. They are Justice Thomas, Justice Alito and Chief Justice Roberts. Justice Gorsuch did not
participate in the consideration or decision of the case.

386

KANSAS LAW REVIEW

Vol. 66

outcome seems unjustified given the Court’s prior recognition that even a
named plaintiff whose own individual claim is mooted may appeal a denial
of class certification order.377 Not only the Court’s precedent, but also its
acknowledgement of the class action’s separate role, warrants a broader
justiciability stance.378
In sum, the Court’s interpretation of constitutional gateway issues—
such as standing, mootness and the existence of a case-or-controversy—
foreshadows the types of challenges and feats those contesting systemic
discrimination can expect going forward. The extent to which a named
plaintiff has sufficient skin in the game to promote class interests is a
continued debate that will have significant ramifications for civil rights
enforcement.
c. Ascertainability
Another significant issue in aggregation jurisprudence is how rigorous
courts should be in requiring litigants to be able to ascertain class
membership as a condition of certification. The Circuit Courts of Appeals
are divided not so much over the propriety of this implicit threshold
itself—which is found nowhere in the class action rule—but over whether
the threshold should be exacting or not. On the one hand, the Third
Circuit,379 joined by the First,380 Fourth381 and Eleventh382 Circuits have
adopted a heightened ascertainability standard which requires that: 1) the
class be “defined with reference to objective criteria” and 2) there is a
“reliable and administratively feasible mechanism for determining
whether putative class members fall within the class definition.”383 On the
377. See U.S. Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 404 (1980). This point was argued in
Brief of Complex Litigation Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 16–17,
Microsoft Corp. v. Baker, 137 S. Ct. 1702 (2017) (No. 15-457) (“The Geraghty Court concluded that
the named party could appeal the denial of class certification despite his mooted claims because ‘[t]he
proposed representative retains a “personal stake” in obtaining class certification sufficient to assure
that Art. III values are not undermined.’” (citing Geraghty, 445 U.S. at 404)).
378. See Brief of Complex Litigation Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents,
supra note 377, at 24–25, of which I was a signatory; see also Sergio J. Campos, Class Actions and
Justiciability, 66 FLA. L. REV. 553, 611–21 (2014).
379. See Byrd v. Aaron’s Inc., 784 F.3d 154, 163 (3d Cir. 2015); Carrera v. Bayer Corp., 727
F.3d 300, 306–08 (3d Cir. 2013); Hayes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 725 F.3d 349, 355 (3d Cir. 2013);
Marcus v. BMW of N. Am. LLC, 687 F.3d 583, 592–94 (3d Cir. 2012).
380. In re Nexium Antitrust Litig., 777 F.3d 9, 19 (1st Cir. 2015).
381. EQT Prod. Co. v. Adair, 764 F.3d 347, 358 (4th Cir. 2014).
382. Karhu v. Vital Pharms. Inc., 621 F. App’x 945, 946 (11th Cir. 2015).
383. See Byrd, 784 F.3d at 163 (quoting Hayes, 725 F.3d at 355). See also Marcus, 687 F.3d at
593 (“If class members are impossible to identify without extensive and individualized fact-finding or
‘mini-trials,’ then a class action is inappropriate.”).
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other hand, the Seventh, joined by the Second, Sixth, Eighth and Ninth
Circuits have rejected the second “administrative feasibility” prong.384
Competing rationales are behind the dueling approaches. Those
supporting heightened ascertainability rely on a number of arguments set
forth by the leading Third Circuit case, Carrera.385 First, the approach
eliminates administrative burdens—such as mini-trials—just to identify
class members, which supports the efficiency goal of aggregate
litigation.386 Second, rigorous ascertainability ensures proper notice to the
class.387 Third, the heightened approach screens out illegitimate claimants
whose participation dilutes recovery for legitimate claimants.388 Finally,
the rigorous bar is necessary to protect defendants’ due process rights to
raise individual defenses and challenge individual class membership.389
Those supporting ascertainability-lite, including most recently the
Ninth Circuit, have countered each of the above rationales.390 First, an
administrative feasibility requirement is not necessary given the class
action rule’s own manageability requirement, which effectively promotes
efficiency.391 By contrast, there is nothing in the rule’s text requiring
administrative feasibility. To import this new standard runs counter to the
Court’s admonition against such impermissible rulemaking. Second, a
heightened ascertainability requirement is not necessary for notice because
the rule requires only the “best notice that is practicable under the
circumstances,” rather than actual notice.392 Third, given the low response
rate to class settlements, the concern over fraudulent submissions is not
384. Mullins v. Direct Dig. LLC, 795 F.3d 654, 657–58 (7th Cir. 2015). The Second Circuit
more recently clarified that it did not adopt the heightened ascertainability requirement. In re Petrobras
Sec., 862 F.3d 250, 265 (2d Cir. 2017) (“With all due respect to our colleagues on the Third Circuit,
we decline to adopt a heightened ascertainability theory that requires a showing of administrative
feasibility at the class certification stage.”). See also Briseno v. ConAgra Foods Inc., 844 F.3d 1121,
1123 (9th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 2017 U.S. LEXIS 6249 (Oct. 10, 2017); Sandusky Wellness Ctr.
LLC v. Medtox Sci. Inc., 821 F.3d 992, 996 (8th Cir. 2016);See also Rikos v. Proctor & Gamble Co.,
799 F.3d 497, 525 (6th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1493 (2016).
385. See Carrera v. Bayer Corp., 727 F.3d 300, 305–08 (3d Cir. 2013).
386. Id. at 305.
387. Id. at 305–06.
388. Id. at 310.
389. Id. at 307.
390. See Briseno v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 844 F.3d 1121, 1123–33 (9th Cir. 2017); Robert G.
Bone, Justifying Class Action Limits: Parsing the Debates Over Ascertainability and Cy Pres, 65 U.
KAN. L. REV. 913, 928–40 (2017) [hereinafter Bone, Justifying Class Action Limits] (making
arguments against rationales given for strict ascertainability and noting that “[a] class can exist without
anyone knowing precisely who is and who is not a member”).
391. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3); Bone, Justifying Class Action Limits, supra note 390, at 933–
35.
392. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B); Bone, Justifying Class Action Limits, supra note 390, at 930–
31.
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significant.393 Finally, a defendant’s due process rights are not implicated
by the ascertainability threshold because the defendant can still raise
individual affirmative defenses and challenges to the named plaintiffs
immediately and to the absent class members later.394 Not surprisingly,
the rigorous ascertainability hurdle is favored by the defense—especially
for low-dollar claims—and the lite one favored by plaintiffs.395
While there is a “growing consensus” among the federal circuits in
favor of ascertainability-lite,396 and some disagreement over just how split
the circuit courts are,397 there remains at least a clear demarcation in
approach between the Third Circuit and others, which would countenance
Supreme Court intervention.398 The Court, however, has declined review
in Mullins v. Direct Digital LLC,399 Rikos v. Proctor & Gamble Co.,400 and
Briseno v. ConAgra Foods, Inc.401
The duel between heightened and lite ascertainability, however, is one
largely appropriate in the context of class actions certified pursuant to Rule
23(b)(3).402 Granted, as civil rights cases seeking monetary relief in
addition to injunctive relief get shunted from Rule 23(b)(2) to (b)(3) postWal-Mart, this ascertainability threshold battle will increasingly matter.
However, civil rights class actions seeking primarily injunctive relief—in
which 23(b)(2) certification is appropriate—should as a normative matter
be immune from any heightened ascertainability requirement given their
fundamental history and role.
Conditioning certification on the ascertainability of class members
should not apply to Rule 23(b)(2) classes because it is immaterial whether
individual class members can be identified.403 The 1966 drafters made
393. See also Bone, Justifying Class Action Limits, supra note 390, at 935–37 (discussing
distribution of class recovery).
394. See id. at 937–39.
395. See Amanda R. Lawrence, The Great Class Action Ascertainability Debate, LAW360 (Aug.
14,
2017
12:47
PM),
https://www.law360.com/articles/953496/the-great-class-actionascertainability-debate; Chad R. Fuller et al., A Serious Circuit Split on Class Ascertainability,
LAW360 (June 30, 2016 4:42 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/813021/a-serious-circuit-spliton-class-ascertainability.
396. See In re Pertrobas Secs., 862 F.3d 250, 265 (2d Cir. 2017).
397. See Alison Frankel, SCOTUS Case Will Test Justice Gorsuch’s Appetite for Class Action
Limits, REUTERS (May 8, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/otc-gorsuch-idUSKBN18424X.
398. See id.
399. 795 F.3d 654 (7th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1161 (2016).
400. 799 F.3d 497 (6th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1493 (2016).
401. 844 F.3d 1121 (9th Cir. 2017), cert denied, 2017 U.S. LEXIS 6249 (Oct. 10, 2017).
402. Bone, Justifying Class Action Limits, supra note 390, at 957 (“[E]ven the strongest
advocates of strict ascertainability refuse to apply it to (b)(2) class actions.”).
403. See Larkin Letter, supra note 281, at 3; see, e.g., Cole v. City of Memphis, 839 F.3d 530,
542 (6th Cir. 2016); Shelton v. Bledsoe, 775 F.3d 554, 557–59, 561, 563 (3d Cir. 2015).

2017

THE MODERN CLASS ACTION RULE

389

clear that (b)(2) applies “in the civil-rights field where a party is charged
with discriminating unlawfully against a class, usually one whose
members are incapable of specific enumeration.”404 The goal of the civil
rights class action provision is to provide a group remedy for group harm.
The very nature of the harm is group-directed.405 The very nature of the
remedy is indivisible, thereby making it unimportant for each individual
class member to be ascertained. Each class member, by virtue of group
membership, will be the beneficiary of the injunctive and/or declaratory
relief.
Moreover, from a pragmatic vantage, heightened ascertainability for
(b)(2) classes is unwarranted because class members are not entitled to
notice or an opportunity to opt out of the collective litigation.406 Unlike
(b)(3), there is no practical need to identify and inform individual class
members of the litigation so that they can participate personally or
withdraw altogether.407
The majority of federal appellate courts recognizes these distinctive
features of the civil rights injunctive class and consequently do not hold it
to a heightened ascertainability standard. Four circuits—including the
most taxing Third Circuit408—have explicitly ruled that ascertainability for
(b)(2) classes is unnecessary.409 Despite such favorable jurisprudence for
civil rights litigants challenging systemic discrimination, the direction of
this gateway jurisprudence is unclear. Should the Court ultimately weigh
in on the propriety of a more rigorous ascertainability requirement, the
Court should recall the rulemakers’ goal to protect and enhance collective
actions against discrimination.
d. Aggregate Proof
Finally, a critical key to class action litigation is to what extent
aggregate proof may be used for certification and class-wide liability. In
Wal-Mart, Justice Scalia rejected the plaintiffs’ proposal to replace
404. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2) advisory committee’s notes to 1966 amendment. The Advisory
Committee explained: “Action or inaction is directed to a class within the meaning of this subdivision
even if it has taken effect or is threatened only as to one or a few members of the class, provided it is
based on grounds which have general application to the class.” Id.
405. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2).
406. Bone, Justifying Class Action Limits, supra note 390, at 930–31.
407. Cole, 839 F.3d at 541.
408. Bone, Justifying Class Action Limits, supra note 390, at 929 (citing Shelton, 775 F.3d at
559–63) (“Yet even the Third Circuit, the strongest proponent of a strict ascertainability rule, declines
to apply it to class actions certified under Rule 23(b)(2).”).
409. Id.
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individualized back pay determinations following a pattern or practice
finding with a sampling method, condemning it as “Trial By Formula.”410
The Court concluded that plaintiffs’ “novel project” would violate the
employer’s right to raise individual defenses under Title VII.411 Thus, it
logically followed that such individualized back pay determinations were
not “incidental” to the injunctive relief sought, making (b)(2) certification
unjustified.412 In Comcast Inc. v. Behrend,413 the Supreme Court denied
class certification in an antitrust case where plaintiffs’ regression model
failed to demonstrate that damages were susceptible to class-wide proof.414
Because of such failure, individual questions predominated over the
common ones, making Rule 23(b)(3) certification inappropriate.415
Following Wal-Mart and Comcast, the notion that class certification is
unjustified where monetary relief has to be calculated on an individualized
basis has gained traction.
Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, a six-to-two decision by Justice
Kennedy, however, has more recently tempered this impression.416 Tyson
Foods allowed aggregate proof or sampling, to prove class-wide liability
in a class action, despite Wal-Mart’s language forbidding “Trial By
Formula.”417 In Tyson Foods, representative proof was permitted where
the underlying substantive law—the Fair Labor Standards Act—allowed
it.418 In particular, the Court permitted the use of a study reporting the
average amount of time it took for an employee to don and doff his
clothing at defendant’s plant, especially where the employer failed to keep
records.419 Tyson Foods also rejected the contention that a class cannot be
certified if it requires individual damages calculations under Rule
23(b)(3)—contrary to how some have interpreted Comcast.420
Individualized damages are permissible, so long as they do not
predominate under Rule 23(b)(3). While Tyson Foods cleared the way for
410. 564 U.S. 338, 366–67 (2011).
411. Id. at 367.
412. Id.
413. 569 U.S. 27 (2013).
414. Id. at 36–38. Plaintiffs’ damages model suffered by not matching the theory of liability
being pursued. Id.
415. See id.
416. 136 S. Ct. 1036 (2016).
417. Id. at 1046–48. The Court relied in part on Brief of Amicus Curiae Complex Litigation Law
Professors in Support of Respondents, Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, 136 S. Ct. 1036 (2016) (No.
14-1146 ), of which I was a signatory.
418. Id. at 1042.
419. Id. at 1047.
420. See id. at 1053, 1056-57 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (discussing Comcast Corp. v. Behrend,
133 S. Ct. 1426, 1433 (2013)).
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a representative or statistical sample to be used in establishing class-wide
liability, Justice Kennedy’s ruling was narrow: its use “will depend on the
purpose for the sample is being introduced and on the underlying cause of
action.”421 Again, the Court’s latest word on the matter has left no clear
victors.
In sum, the renewed jurisprudential interest in the modern aggregation
rule has led to mixed results for litigants trying to use the class action to
contest systemic discrimination. On the one hand, named plaintiffs have
successfully staved off dismissal because of unaccepted offers of
judgment or settlement. They may still challenge certain discretionary
practices as discriminatory, forum shop, and structure the parameters of
litigation such that certification is more likely. They continue to represent
others, even when their own claims are resolved, and to use aggregate
proof when defendants do not keep records.
On the other hand, litigants alleging discrimination have a far more
formidable evidentiary task of proving commonality in systemic
discrimination cases. For cases mirroring Wal-Mart’s theory of liability,
decentralized decision-making and size, this task is all but impossible.
Moreover, plaintiffs are largely foreclosed from seeking monetary relief
under the class action rule’s civil rights provision, resulting in greater cost
and risk to successfully aggregate their claims. Named plaintiffs are no
longer able to immediately challenge a class certification denial by
voluntarily dismissing their claims with prejudice or to represent a class
without having an actual injury. Meanwhile, the Court’s robust procedural
docket continues to grow—with the addition of a new Justice as well422—
leaving the landscape yet still subject to contour.423

421. Id. at 1049.
422. See Ron Chapman Jr. & Christopher Murray, Gorsuch and the Future of Class Action
Waivers, LAW360 (Feb. 1, 2017, 1:28 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/887293/gorsuch-andthe-future-of-class-action-waivers; Jeremy M. Creelan, Class Certification: Will Gorsuch Pick Up
Where Scalia Left Off?, N.Y. L.J. (Feb. 14, 2017), http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/
id=1202779162473/Class-Certification-Will-Gorsuch-Pick-Up-Where-Scalia-Left-Off?slreturn=
20170909132830; Frankel, supra note 397 (describing Justice Gorsuch’s first majority opinion).
423. This evolving jurisprudence is taking place before a backdrop of Congressional effort to
resurrect proposals recently rejected or tabled by the Rule 23 Subcommittee and Advisory Committee.
Compare Fairness in Class Action Litigation and Furthering Asbestos Claim Transparency Act of
2017, H.R. 985, 115th Cong. with REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE ON RULES OF
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 25–27 (summary of Rule 23 proposed amendments), App’x C-8–C-29
(red-lined Rule 23 with Advisory Committee Notes) (Sept. 2017) [hereinafter JUDICIAL CONFERENCE
COMMITTEE REPORT], http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/2017-09-jcus-report_0.pdf. A
discussion of the impropriety of this legislative effort—in substance and process—is beyond the scope
of this article.
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IV. A CRITIQUE OF MODERN CLASS ACTION JURISPRUDENCE
Now more than ever, there is a pressing need for the civil litigation
system to function properly as the rule of law is increasingly under siege.
The current assault on the Constitutional and civil rights of persons based
on race, religion, gender, immigration status and more threatens the very
fabric of American society. Greater violence, hate crimes, discrimination
and divisive policies will undoubtedly lead to greater litigation, and
already have.424 The country is at a painful juncture in American history,
where its values of equality and justice in a pluralistic society, are arguably
tested on the daily.
This crisis point is a good time to recollect the values emanating the
modern class action rule’s civil rights provision, and recommit to honoring
the drafters’ intent. Five decades ago, the rule drafters found themselves
in a similar chaos, where tectonic societal shifts challenged them to design
procedures that would enable “parties to secure the just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.”425 The
modern class action rule’s civil rights provision was one answer to that
societal turmoil and a concrete embodiment of how historically
marginalized people could seek justice and efficiency in the federal courts.
This very same rule remains today and continues to play a critical role in
American democracy.426
424. See, e.g., Nomi Prins & Tom Dispatch, The White House as Donald Trump’s New Casino,
SALON (Sept. 26, 2017, 3:00 AM), https://www.salon.com/2017/09/26/the-white-house-as-donaldtrumps-new-casino_partner/ (explaining how President Trump has “been sued 134 times in federal
court since he assumed the presidency”).
425. FED. R. CIV. P. 1.
426. Brief of Amici Curiae NAACP Legal Defense & Education Fund, Inc., et. al in Support of
Respondents in Nos. 16-285 & 16-300 and Petitioner in No. 16-307 at 1–7, 19–26, Epic Sys. Corp. v.
Lewis, 137 S. Ct. 809 (2017) (Nos. 16-285, 16-300, 16-307), 2017 WL 3588728 (describing
importance of collective action to enforce anti-discrimination statutes). The NAACP Legal Defense
and Educational Fund, the Impact Fund, and thirty civil rights organization describe the current
necessity for collective action in combatting employment discrimination:
Concerted actions are essential to remedying employment discrimination, and much
important civil rights jurisprudence has developed in the context of this group paradigm.
Individualized actions, by contrast, are poorly equipped to address pervasive and
entrenched discrimination. They preclude workers from using three major tools for
identifying and remedying workplace discrimination.
Id. at 19.
In addition to the class action, court-ordered injunctions that apply to non-parties nationwide
have gained traction as a means of creating systemic change under both the Obama and Trump
administrations. See generally, Samuel L. Bray, Multiple Chancellors: Reforming the National
Injunction, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1 (2017). Whether a national injunction is an appropriate alternative
to representative litigation is an important issue, which I am grateful to Professor Howard Wasserman
for raising. While the issue is beyond the scope of this paper, this timely discussion is starting.
Compare Bray, supra, at 4, 60 (arguing for a prohibition of national injunctions and offering the class

2017

THE MODERN CLASS ACTION RULE

393

This is not to say that this procedural vehicle is flawless or free from
abuse. There are a number of ways in which the rule may be improved, as
recognized by recent proposals of the Rule 23 Subcommittee to the
Advisory Committee on Civil Rules and related comments, testimony and
input provided by the bar, bench and legal academy nationwide.427
Tellingly, however, is that the Advisory Committee ultimately chose not
to change Rule 23’s civil rights class action provision.428 The text of the
modern class action rule—the fulcrum upon which all federal cases
balance—does not necessitate or explain the higher hurdle for civil rights
class certification. Rather, it is judicial interpretation of the rule’s
scriptures that has resulted in the rule’s diminished utility.429
Despite the pendulum’s swing from a heyday of civil rights class
actions to a more measured one, class actions are still being brought to
enforce all manner of civil rights today. For example, a half dozen Black
men and women, Black Lives Matter Chicago, and a number of
community organizations recently filed a (b)(2) class action complaint
seeking federal court oversight of Chicago City’s Police Department,
alleging various unconstitutional racially discriminatory policies and
practices against thousands of individuals, primarily Black and Latinx.430
action as the “obvious answer”); with Suzette M. Malveaux, Response: Class Actions, Civil Rights,
and the National Injunction, HARV. L. REV. F. (forthcoming Dec. 2017) (opposing prohibition and
flagging problem of sole reliance on the class action).
427. COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF
THE U.S., PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF APPELLATE,
BANKRUPTCY, CIVIL, AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 193–95 (Aug. 2016) [hereinafter PRELIMINARY
DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS], http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/2016-08preliminary_draft_of_rules_forms_published_for_public_comment_0.pdf; JUDICIAL CONFERENCE
ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL RULES, PUBLIC HEARING ON PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE BEFORE THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL
RULES (Nov. 3, 2016), http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/written_testimony_for_civil_rules_
hearing_11-3-16_0.pdf; JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL RULES, PUBLIC
HEARING ON PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE BEFORE THE
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES (Jan. 4, 2017),
http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/2017-01-04-testimony_and_comment_handout.pdf.
428. The proposed amendments ultimately disseminated by the Civil Rules Advisory Committee
do not address Rule 23(b)(2)’s treatment of monetary relief or Rule 23(a)’s heightened evidentiary
burden for commonality out of deference to the Court’s decision in Wal-Mart. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE
COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 423 with PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS, supra
note 427, at 218–32.
429. As discussed, this pendulum continues to swing, and has not yet rested on a clear landing
place.
430. See Class Action Complaint at 2–7, 114–20, 127–131, Campbell v. City of Chicago, No.
1:16-CV-04467, 2017 WL 2587483 (N.D. Ill. June 14, 2017); Press Release, MacArthur Justice
Center, Landmark Class Action Lawsuit Filed Against the City of Chicago Alleging Racially
Discriminatory Policing and Violent Police Abuse (June 14, 2017), http://www.law.northwestern.edu/
legalclinic/macarthur/projects/police/documents/CPD%20Class%20Action%20Press%20Release%2
0FINAL.pdf.
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Another example of a recent (b)(2) class action is one brought by a male
and female Army veteran on behalf of hundreds of thousands of veterans
since 9/11 who served in Iraq and Afghanistan and developed posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) or traumatic brain injury during their
service and were allegedly released with less-than-Honorable discharges
in violation of the Constitution and Administrative Procedure Act.431
In addition to the traditional civil rights injunctive class actions
pursued under (b)(2), cases seeking monetary relief for similar alleged
violations of federal law are also being pursued under (b)(3). For example,
in a case brought on behalf of veterans disabled in combat, the National
Veterans Legal Services Program brought a (b)(3) class action against the
federal government, alleging that its policy improperly capped retroactive
disability payments owed to six years, thereby depriving thousands of
veterans their proper benefits.432 Most recently, three female employees
filed a class action against Google, alleging that it systematically
discriminated against women in hiring, pay and promotions, in violation
of various local labor laws. 433 Plaintiffs seek wages due, damages, and
injunctive relief, and pursue certification under a California law similar to
(b)(3).434 Of course, some contemporary class actions have been brought
under both (b)(2) and (b)(3). For example, a class action was filed on
behalf of impoverished members of the Ferguson, Missouri community
against the City for its policy of allegedly using its municipal court and
jail to collect fees and fines as a revenue source for the City, functionally
operating a debtor’s prison system in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process clause.435
431. See Amended Complaint at 1–3, 25–27, Kennedy v. Speer, No. 3:16-cv-2010-WWE, 2017
WL 4157527 (D. Conn Apr. 17, 2017); Yale Law School, Veterans Clinic Files Nationwide ClassAction Lawsuit on Behalf of Army Veterans, IN THE PRESS (Apr. 17, 2017), https://law.yale.edu/ylstoday/news/veterans-clinic-files-nationwide-class-action-lawsuit-behalf-army-veterans.
432. See Class Action Complaint at 1, 6, 16, Soto v. United States, No. 1:17-cv-00051 (S.D. Tex.
Mar. 2, 2017); Press Release, National Veterans Legal Services Program, NVLSP Files Class Action
Lawsuit Against Federal Government Over Unlawful Policy Shortchanging Combat-Injured Veterans
on Their Disability Benefits (March 2, 2017), http://www.nvlsp.org/news-room/press-releases/nvlspfiles-class-action-lawsuit-against-government-over-shortchanging-comb.
433. Class Action Complaint at 1–3, 6–7, Ellis v. Google, Inc., No. CGC-17-561299, 2017 WL
4075207 (Cal. Super. Sept. 14, 2017); Press Release, Lieff Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein, LLP,
Google Sued in Class Action Alleging Sex Discrimination—Complaint Charges Google With
Multiple Pay and Promotion Violations, Illegal Occupational Segregation of Female Employees (Sept.
14,
2017),
https://www.lieffcabraser.com/2017/09/google-sued-in-class-action-alleging-sexdiscrimination/; Clare O’Connor, ‘One in 100 Million’ Chance Alleged Gender Pay Gap at Google is
Random, Says Class Action Lawyer, FORBES (Aug. 9, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
clareoconnor/2017/08/09/one-in-100-million-chance-alleged-gender-pay-gap-at-google-is-randomsays-class-action-lawyer/#6beb3fb82d52.
434. Id.
435. Class Action Complaint at 1–5, Fant et al. v. City of Ferguson, No. 4L15-CV-00253-AGF,
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Preservation of the civil rights class action is even more critical today
in light of the new administration’s retraction of systemic pattern or
practice cases by executive agencies tasked with enforcement of antidiscrimination statutes.436 The private bar will need to fill the void left by
such retraction.437 There is ample evidence that marginalized people and
their advocates are up for the task. Betty Dukes, the named plaintiff in
Wal-Mart, is a perfect example of someone with the grit and perseverance
that characterizes many who challenge widespread systemic
discrimination on behalf of others. Although Ms. Dukes recently passed
away, her spirit lives on in others that carry the torch against injustice. At
a Senate Judiciary Committee hearing on access to justice issues, and in
response to Senator Patrick Leahy’s question about whether she would
give up after her loss in the Supreme Court’s ruling in Wal-Mart, Ms.
Dukes said no, “The best is yet to come.”438 Indeed, the future direction
of collective action, as suggested by some of the Supreme Court’s recent
class action jurisprudence, may be on the rise.439
V. CONCLUSION
At this point, the pendulum has swung away from the heyday of classwide injunctions against systemic discrimination towards a more complex
2017 WL 3392073 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 8, 2015); see also Jenkins et al. v. City of Jennings, No. 4:15-cv00252 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 8, 2015) (similar case brought against the city of Jennings). The suit against
the City of Jennings was settled for $4.7 million. Stephen S. Hsu, Jennings to pay $4.7M settlement
to those jailed over court debts, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (July 14, 2016),
http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/metro/jennings-to-pay-m-settlement-to-those-jailed-overcourt/article_e0ffdc5c-6996-5cb9-b9db-8d6cbfa9dc0a.html.
436. See e.g., Letter from Candice Jackson, Acting Assistant Sec’y, Office for Civil Rights, U.S.
Dep’t of Educ., to College and University Presidents (Sept. 22, 2017), https://www2.ed.gov/
about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-title-ix-201709.pdf (withdrawing Title IX guidance on
investigating and adjudicating allegations of campus sexual misconduct); Letter from Sandra Battle,
Acting Assistant Sec’y, Office for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., and T.E. Wheeler, II, Acting
Assistant Attorney Gen. for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to College and University Presidents
(Feb. 22, 2017), http://i2.cdn.turner.com/cnn/2017/images/02/23/1atransletterpdf022317.pdf
(withdrawing Title IX guidance on protections for LGBT persons use of sex-segregated facilities);
Press Release, Department of Justice, Department of Justice Announces Changes to the Collaborative
Reform Initiative (Sept. 15, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/department-justice-announceschanges-collaborative-reform-initiative (withdrawing collaborative reform efforts in policing).
437. See Perry Cooper, Will Civil Rights Class Actions Multiply Under Trump?, BLOOMBERG
BNA NEWS (Dec. 2, 2016), https://www.bna.com/civil-rights-class-n73014447996/ (Impact Fund
Executive Director Jocelyn Larkin, Esq. and Professor Suzette Malveaux describing role of private
bar enforcement and class actions in civil rights).
438. Barriers to Justice and Accountability: How the Supreme Court’s Recent Rulings Will Affect
Corporate Behavior Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 14 (2011) (statement of Betty
Dukes, Lead Plaintiff on Wal-Mart, Inc. v. Dukes), https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/
media/doc/11-6-29%20Dukes%20Testimony.pdf.
439. See SEYFARTH SHAW LLP, 2017 REPORT, supra note 274, at 5.
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web of conditions. The modern class action rule’s civil rights provision
was admittedly born in a simpler time. Fifty years after the modern rule’s
birth, there has been great expansion in substantive rights and remedies,
societal diversity, technological advances and globalization. Although
explicit bigotry and hatred still exist—and have found renewed expression
as of late—the Jim Crow signs delineating separate facilities for Blacks
and Whites and numerous facially discriminatory policies have become
relics of the past. In their place, institutional racism and structural barriers,
on the one hand, and implicit bias of individuals,440 on the other hand,441
account for much of the driving force behind group disparities.
Although the specific targets of anti-discrimination litigation may
look different, at their core is systemic subordination that Rule 23(b)(2)
was designed to address.442 The Rule’s goal of enabling broad injunctive
and declaratory relief appropriate to the class as a whole when
countenanced is as salient today as it was a half century ago.
Contemporary class action jurisprudence should recommit itself to
allowing the procedural rules to function as the drafters intended and
enable American values like equality and justice to prevail. Too much is
at stake on this golden anniversary.

440. This is true, of course, for discrimination based on other protected classes as well.
441. This, of course, does not suggest that there is not significant explicit bias, which is wellevidenced by the increase in violence and hate crimes by white supremacist organizations. See Mark
Potok, The Year in Hate and Extremism, SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER (Feb. 15, 2017),
https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/intelligence-report/2017/year-hate-and-extremism
(discussing the increase of people in white nationalist/neo-Nazi groups); see also supra notes 1–3 and
accompanying text (discussing a spike in an unprecedented spike in hate crimes, violence and
discrimination in modern American history).
442. I.e., formalized segregation and Jim Crow laws.

